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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS - TORTS - GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST RATHER
THAN INTEREST OF PARTIES AS DOMICILIARIES IS PRIMARY CON-
SIDERATION IN DETERMINING STATE'S INTEREST UNDER CENTER OF
GRAVITY THEORY.
Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (N.Y. 1965)
A commercial airliner, owned and operated by defendant, "disinte-
grated in flight" near the Delaware-Maryland border en route from San
Juan, Puerto Rico, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the wreckage falling to
earth in the vicinity of Elkton, Maryland. Two of the passengers killed in
the accident had resided in Pennsylvania and had purchased tickets in that
state for round-trip flights from Philadelphia to San Juan. Their personal
representatives brought wrongful death actions in a New York state court
against defendant, a New York corporation having its principal place of
business in that state. The airline moved to dismiss because under the
wrongful death statute of Maryland, the lex loci delicti, plaintiffs had no
standing to sue.' The trial court's denial of the motion was reversed 2 by
the appellate division, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the order holding
that under the "center of gravity" theory as announced in Babcock v.
Jackson8 the state of Pennsylvania had the greatest interest in, and the most
significant relationship with, the issue presented, and that, therefore, the
law of that state should be applied. In determining which state had the
dominant interest the court looked primarily to the governmental interests,
that is, the interest of the state in furthering the policy underlying its law,
1. Maryland's wrongful death statute allows recovery only in actions brought
"for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall
have been so caused or if there be no such person or persons entitled, then any person
related to the deceased by blood or marriage, who, as a matter of fact, was wholly
dependent upon the person whose death shall have been so caused." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 67, § 4 (1957). Plaintiffs were brothers and sisters who would have had no
standing to sue under the Maryland statute. Pennsylvania law provides, however,
that a wrongful death action may be brought by the widow of the deceased, or "if
there be no widow, the personal representative may maintain an action for and recover
damages for the death. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). A personal
representative is also "entitled to recover damages for reasonable hospital, nursing,
medical, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration necessitated by reason of
injuries causing death" under the Pennsylvania statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1602 (1953). Plaintiffs would also have had standing under New York law, which
permits a wrongful death action to be brought by the personal representative of the
decedent regardless of relationship. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 130.
2. Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 260
N.Y.S.2d 750 (1965).
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rather than the interests of the parties as domiciliaries of a particular state.
Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d
796 (1965).
The substantive rights and liabilities of parties to tort actions have
traditionally been determined by the lex loci delicti. This rule originally
derived its justification from the vested rights theory under which an
injured person was said to be vested with a right under the laws of the state
in which he was injured, and the state of the forum had an obligation
to enforce this right.4 The vested rights theory was greatly discredited by
the commentators, 5 and some states rejected it in favor of an approach in
which the forum state applied its own "local law" with respect to choice
of law. But even under this "local law" approach, the lex loci rule continued
to be applied in multi-state tort actions. While advantages of uniformity
and predictability of result make the lex loci rule attractive, a rule which
makes choice of law depend invariably upon the fortuitous circumstance
of the place of the injury is not without certain inadequacies.
The universal mechanistic application of lex loci delicti as a nostrum
for choice of law ills in the field of torts was first challenged in New York
in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. 7 Edward Kilberg died when a com-
mercial jet plane in which he was a passenger ingested starlings and crashed
near Nantucket, Massachusetts. Kilberg had been a domiciliary of New
York and had purchased a ticket in that state for a flight to Nantucket.
His administrator sued Northeast Airlines in a New York wrongful death
action grounded on Massachusetts law. Although the issue had not been
raised on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
provision of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute8 which limited to
$15,000 the amount of damages recoverable should not be applied because
such a limitation on damages in wrongful death actions was contrary to
the public policy of New York, and because the measure of damages was
a matter of procedure and not substantive law, and thus was not within
4. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194
U.S. 120, 126 (1904) ; the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); compare RSTATEMNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 384 (1934).
5. See the opinion of Judge L. Hand in Guiness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 538 (2d Cir. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Guiness,
269 U.S. 71 (1925) ; CooK, THt LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF TH CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1-48, 341-44 (1949) ; see also Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63
HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
6. Professor Cook's definition of the "local law" approach is as follows: "The
forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own
law to the case, but in doing so adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision
identical, or at least highly similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of
decision found in the system of law in force in another state or country with which
some or all of the foreign elements are connected. . . . The forum thus enforces
not a foreign right but a right created by its own law." COOK, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 20-21.
7. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). Compare Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp.
40 (D. Mass. 1949) ; Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953);
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 346, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) ; Haumschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1955).
SPRING 1966]
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1966], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss3/9
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the coverage of the lex loci rule which pertains only to the latter. In
Davenport v. Webb9 the New York high court revealed that the charac-
terization of the damage limitation as procedural rather than substantive
had not played nearly so important a part in its decision in Kilberg as had
the recognition of a strong public policy against the maximum damages
provision of the Massachusetts statute. But the underlying rationale of
this strong public policy is not clearly defined. On the one hand, the court
would seem to have based its decision upon a need to protect domiciliaries
of New York against "unfair and anachronistic treatment" under the laws
of a sister state whose relation to the transaction may be slight. On the
other hand, the decision appears to be grounded upon the forum state's
interest in promoting a policy underlying its law which views a limitation
on damages in wrongful death actions as "absurd and unjust, in measuring
the pecuniary value of all lives, to the next of kin, by the same arbitrary
standard."'1 Despite this ambiguity, the Kilberg decision must be viewed
as having weakened the lex loci rule in that it recognized that the law of
the forum will be employed in certain instances where the forum state's
relation to the particular occurrence is more significant than that of the
locus delicti.11
In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,12 a wrongful death action
involving a factual situation identical to that presented in Kilberg, defen-
dant contended that the failure of a federal district court sitting in New
York to enforce Massachusetts' damage limitation constituted a violation
of the full faith and credit clause. A majority of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, adopting a "vested rights" approach, held that New
York was under a constitutional obligation to apply the law of Massachu-
setts in toto. Mr. Justice Kaufman, vigorously dissenting, averted to certain
language used by Chief Justice Warren in Richards v. United States1"
to the effect that a forum state is free to apply the law of any state having
a "sufficiently substantial contact" with the particular transaction in ques-
tion to the exclusion of the law of the locus delicti. Judge Kaufman
asserted that, as New York was the domicile of the decedent and his
beneficiaries and a principal place of business of the defendant, that state
had a sufficient interest to justify the exclusive application of its law under
the rationale of the Richards decision. Since New York was not initially
obligated to apply Massachusetts law it could, if Massachusetts law were
deemed applicable to the case at bar, constitutionally refuse to apply that
law in its entirety in order to further its public policy against limitation of
liability. In addition, the dissenter declared the federal policy against
forum-shopping is not sufficient to prevent a state's assertion of its interest
9. 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962).
10. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 6 App. Div. 42, 46 (1896); see also
N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 16 (1954).
11. See Paulsen & Souvern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM.
L. Rtv. 969, 981 (1956).
12. 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
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in such a situation. On rehearing en banc, a majority of the court, adopting
Judge Kaufman's dissent, upheld the Kilberg approach as a proper exercise
of a state's power to develop its conflict of laws rules. 14
The historic opinion in Babcock v. Jackson 5 spelled the end of the
reign of lex loci delicti as a rule governing choice of law in New York. In
that case the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory, which
had previously been applied only in contract actions, 16 was applied to an
action brought under New York's automobile guest statute by a New York
plaintiff against a New York defendant for injuries sustained in an acci-
dent in Ontario. But while the "center of gravity" theory as it was applied
to contract actions provided no standards and amounted to a mere counting
of "contacts," the rule enunciated in Babcock involved an analysis of the
relative "interests" and "contacts" of the states involved on a comparative
basis with regard to each issue presented, the law of the state having "the
dominant interest" being applied with regard to that issue. Babcock
introduced "an approach for accommodating the competing interests in
tort cases with multi-state contacts."' 17 Pennsylvania followed New York's
lead in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,'8 applying the Babcock "center of
gravity" theory to a wrongful death action involving a factual situation
which paralleled that of Kilberg and Pearson.
Neither Griffith nor Babcock, however, resolve the basic ambiguity of
Kilberg with regard to the primary considerations underlying the "policy
analysis" approach, for the justification for applying the policy of the forum
or that of a foreign state to a particular issue is not clearly defined in either
decision. At least one federal district court has taken the position that the
interests of the parties as domiciliaries as opposed to governmental interests
are paramount. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,19 involved a wrongful
death action arising out of the same crash that prompted the Kilberg and
Pearson litigations and was based on identical facts with the exception that
at the time of the commencement of the action plaintiffs were domiciliaries
of Maryland. The court applied the Massachusetts limitation on damages
asserting that plaintiffs were entitled to no better treatment than they would
have received from a Maryland court which would have applied the limita-
tion had the action been brought in that state.20 The Gore decision is
effectively overruled by the decision in the instant case.
The instant court, unlike the district court in Gore, did not apply the
choice of law rules of Pennsylvania as the state of plaintiffs' domicile, but
14. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 912 (1963).
15. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). Compare RESTATEIMENT (SECOND),
CONFLICT O LAWS §§ 379-403 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) ; Morris, The Proper Law
of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951). See also Comments on Babcock v. Jackson,
A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
16. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
17. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1963).
18. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). See Comment, 10 VILL. L. REv. 100 (1964).
19. 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
20. MD. CODE ANN. art. 67, § 2 (1957).
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weighed the policies underlying the wrongful death statutes of Pennsylvania
and Maryland in determining which state had the dominant interest under
the "center of gravity" theory. The fact that decedents were domiciliaries
of Pennsylvania, had purchased their tickets in that state, and that Penn-
sylvania was the place where the flight was to begin and terminate were
relevant, as were other "contacts," only in so far as they resulted in focusing
upon the governmental interests of the states involved. Under the Long
approach, the weight given a particular contact will vary with the issue
presented. While domicile is one of the "touchstones" employed in deter-
mining governmental interest, it is not invariably the "keystone."
2'
The rejection of the Gore "protective approach" to Babcock which
emphasized the domicile of plaintiffs in favor of a governmental interest
approach as the policy criterion for determining choice of law has serious
consequences with regard to the assumed primary objective of conflict of
laws - uniformity of result.2 2 Under the Long decision forum-shopping
becomes a definite problem. A plaintiff is free to "shop" for the most
favorable forum, and, under a recent Supreme Court decision, 23 carry the
law of that state with him, if, in an action brought in a federal district
court, the defendant should secure removal under section 1404(a) of
Title 28.24 But while uniformity of result is an important factor to con-
sider in determining an appropriate rule for choice of law, it should not be
viewed as an end in itself. "[A]gainst the advantages of uniformity must
be balanced the desirability of latitude for states with divergent ideas to
establish their own patterns of community life and standards of domestic
behavior. '25 This balancing is certainly more likely to be achieved under
the flexible rule of Long than the more rigid Gore rule under which the
domicile of plaintiff is paramount.
It is interesting to speculate whether the New York Court of Appeals,
had they applied the Gore rationale in Long, would have achieved the
same result as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court employing the same "center
of gravity" theory. The question is of interest not only with regard to the
implications resulting from a forum state's application of foreign law in
the abstract, but also because standards for the application of the Babcock
doctrine are not clearly defined. It is entirely possible that on a given set
of facts two courts applying the "center of gravity" theory might reach
21. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1247, remarks of Professor Leflar, at 1250 (1963).
22. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1156 (1947).
23. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1965).
25. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflicts of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1159 (1947). The Harper article
is significant for the light it sheds on the reasoning behind the "center of gravity"
approach. Judge Fuld did not agree with the majority's position in Kilberg with
regard to the Massachusetts' damage limitation because the court dealt with a matter
not raised on appeal. He did,,however, state in a concurring opinion citing the Harper
article (9 N.Y.2d at 53, 172 N.E.2d at 531) that if the matter were one of first
impression, the "significant contacts theory" might be argued effectively. The majority
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different results. At present at least, predictability is not an asset of the
"center of gravity" approach. An attorney preparing for litigation resulting
from an occurrence which involves multi-state contacts may be uncertain
as to the law to be applied with regard to one or more issues of the case. The
problem becomes particularly acute in actions arising out of airplane crashes
where seventy or eighty actions may be brought against an airline in several
states. Negotiation for settlement may be difficult, if not impossible.
Those problems of uncertainty and unpredictability must, however, be
viewed in proper perspective. The fact that most torts are committed within
a single state and that in most cases involving multi-state torts, the Kilberg
and Long cases for instance, the "center of gravity" can easily be ascer-
tained minimizes the problems considerably. Resolution of the difficult case
will be achieved only upon further and more explicit definition of the
theory. The present decision is the first step in that direction. Of course,
it is evident that the "center of gravity" theory will not approach the degree
of certainty and predictability offered by the lex loci rule. Neither will it
exact the sacrifice of lex loci with regard to policy considerations under-
lying the law of the states involved in a multi-state transaction in order to
accomplish these ends. "The difference is not between a system and no
system, but between two systems; between a system which purports to
have but lacks, complete logical symmetry and one which affords latitude
for the interplay and clash of conflicting policy factors. '26
The battle for predominance between the lex loci delicti and the "center
of gravity" approaches is basically a conflict between a rule which places
uniformity, predictability, and certainty above all, and a theory which views
"justice, fairness and the best practical result" in each individual case as
the controlling policy.27 The choice is essentially between a rule which
deals in simplicities and one which aims at an objective appraisal of the
realities of each case presented. Whatever lex loci may accomplish by
way of simplicity and ease of application, however, is overshadowed by the
absurdity of expecting a state to disregard any interest it (or another
state) may have in an action for a blind subservience to the law of a state
whose interest may be entirely fortuitous.28 The Babcock-Long approach
attempts to give proper weight to the varying interest in multi-state litiga-
tion. The establishment of a predictable rule will be a difficult task. But
the end result of the search for a definitive "center of gravity" theory will not
reduce the quest for an "ungritlike picture of reality" 29 to an absurdity as
has been the case with the mechanistic application of the lex loci delicti rule.
Louis F. Nicharot
26. Id. at 1158.
27. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1963).
28. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39-40, 172 N.E.2d 526,
527-28 (1961).
29. HULM4, SPECULATIONs 224 (1960); See also Roberts, A Rule is a Rule
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CONTEMPT - REFUSAL OF GRAND JURY
WITNESS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS MAY NOT BE PUNISHED SUM-
MARILY UNDER FEDERAL RULE 42 (a).
Harris v. United States (U.S. 1965)
Pursuant to a subpoena, petitioner appeared as a witness before a
federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York investigating
alleged violations of the Federal Communications Act. Petitioner refused
to answer several questions propounded by the United States Attorney
on the ground of possible self-incrimination. He was then taken before
the district court which, after hearing arguments, ruled that he must
answer the questions since his fifth amendment privilege was unavailable
in view of the statutorily granted immunity to prosecution accorded
ritnesses before a grand jury investigating violations of the Federal
Communications Act.' Petitioner returned to the grand jury room where
he reasserted his fifth amendment rights and persisted in his refusal to
inswer the questions. He was again brought before the district court and
3worn as a witness. The district judge posed the same questions and
.tirected him to answer in open court. Upon petitioner's continued re-
fusal to reply, the court summarily adjudged him guilty of criminal
contempt under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and ordered him imprisoned for one year. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed.2 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed, holding, four justices dissenting, that summary commit-
ment under Rule 42(a) is inappropriate where the real contempt is before a
grand jury and not in a district court proceeding which is merely ancillary
to the grand jury investigation. Petitioner was entitled to notice and a
hearing as provided in Rule 42(b) since Rule 42(a) is reserved for
criminal contempts involving "exceptional circumstances" occurring in
the actual presence of the court.8 Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162
(1965).4
1. 47 U.S.C. 409(1) (1962).
2. United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964).
3. Rule 42. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished sum-
marily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct con-
stituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be
signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as
provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice.
The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reason-
able time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential
facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as
such. . . . The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in
which an act of Congress so provides. . . . If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified
from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's con-
sent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order
fixing the punishment.
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Criminal contempt is sui generis in that it is not a crime but is
punishable by criminal sanctions.5 The summary power to punish criminal
contempt has been styled an "anomaly" in the law6 and is regarded by
some commentators as a vestige of pathological practices spawned by the
infamous Star Chamber.7 Under its panoply, a single judge may charge
a person with criminal contempt, prosecute him for it, conduct his trial,
find him guilty and sentence him to prison. Apologists contend that the
summary contempt power is "inherent" in courts and is necessary to
preserve the authority of the judicial institution.8
Contempt may be civil as well as criminal, and although the dis-
tinction may be crucial in a particular case9 there are only ill-defined
criteria for categorizing a particular contemptuous act.' 0 Criminal con-
tempt consists in an obstruction of judicial proceedings in a manner
evincing disrespect for the court and is punished as a crime, that is, by
fine or imprisonment." Civil contempt is disobedience to a judicial
command which disadvantages an adverse party and may be remedied
by future compliance ;12 to secure such the court will customarily impose
a fine payable to the adverse party or order conditional imprisonment.
There is much overlapping and few contemptuous acts are readily
classifiable. The contemptuous refusal to answer a question in a judicial
proceeding may be either criminal, civil or both1 3 since the completed act
of defiance is an affront to the court's authority and at the same time
may deprive an adverse party of information. To a recalcitrant witness,
punishment may be preferable to coercion since confinement under a
5. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924) ; Bowles v. United States, 50
F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 648 (1931).
6. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (dissenting opinion of
Black, J.).
7. See note 20 infra.
8. In the case of contempt committed in the actual presence of the court (in
facie curiae) an additional reason is sometimes given. Since the judge has personally
witnessed the acts constituting the contempt there is no need for observing the
ordinary processes of the law. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
9. Although a criminal contemnor's rights are few, a civil contemnor's are even
fewer. Among those rights accorded the former are: presumption of innocence,
immunity from double jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, right to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, eligibility for executive pardon. None
of these are available to a person held in civil contempt. Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83,
96 (1947) and cases cited; see also Civil And Criminal Contempts In The Federal
Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167 (1955) ; Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13
SYRACUst L. REv. 44 (1961).
10. Among those that have been suggested are: purpose of the proceeding (puni-
tive or remedial), identity of the prosecuting plaintiff, the prayer for relief and the
character of the contemptuous act. Civil And Criminal Contempts In The Federal
Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 178-79 (1955).
11. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) ; In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (8th
Cir. 1902).
12. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949) ; Gompers v. Bucks
Stove Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
13. Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1951).
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finding of civil contempt is for an indefinite period, release being con-
tingent upon the witness's willingness to testify.'
4
Contempts differ according to locus as well. A direct contempt is a
contemptuous act "committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court or so near the presence of the court as to obstruct or interrupt
the due and orderly course of proceedings."' 15 Indirect or constructive
contempts are those occurring out of the presence of the court but
which tend to impede the administration of justice.'6
The proceedings to punish criminal contempt in the federal courts are
three: summary commitment or disposition 7 (immediate judicial action
without right of notice or hearing), summary trial (right of notice and
hearing where a defense may be presented), 8 and jury trial.19 Throughout
this note "summary proceedings" will refer to both summary commitments
and summary trials.
Modern scholarship has discovered that at one time all contempts were
indictable crimes but at some juncture became sui generis and punishable
on the court's own motion by summary proceedings.2 0 The Constitution
14. If the contemnor can no longer purge himself (where a trial has ended or the
term of a grand jury expires), there is some authority that the civil contempt is
thereby abated. Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1955), modified, 355
U.S. 66 (1957) ; Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 340 U.S. 898 (1950).
5. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 390 (4th ed. 1951) ; but see Nye v. United States,
113 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), where
direct contempt in the federal courts is defined as contempt committed in the "physical
presence of the court."
16. O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
17. For the purpose of convenience, the term "summary commitment," meaning
summary imprisonment, will be used throughout this note. This is not meant, how-
ever, to suggest that the court, at its discretion, could not levy a fine as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1962). As the term is used, it is co-extensive with the procedure
delineated in Rule 42(a). The word "summary" as used in Rule 42(a) has been
explained as follows:
We think 'summary' as used in this Rule does not refer to the timing of the
action with reference to the offense but refers to a procedure which dispenses with
the formality, delay and digression that would result from the issuance of process,
service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a con-
ventional court trial.
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
18. This "trial" or hearing requires that,
the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity
to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the
assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony,
either relevant to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the
offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) ; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b)
supra note 3.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 402, § 3691 (1962). If the contempt constitutes a criminal offense
under any statute of the United States (excluding § 401) § 402 requires that it be prose-
cuted under § 3691 which provides for jury trial except in certain specified instances.
20. Much has been written on the origins of the contempt power. For complete
discussions, see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) ; Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941) ; GOLDFARB, THI CONTEMPT POWE R (1963); THOMAS, PROBLSMS
OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934); Frankfurter & Landis, Power Of Congress Over
Procedure In Criminal Contempt In "Inferior" Federal Courts - A Study In Separa-
tion Of Powers, 37 HARV. L. Rgv. 1010 (1924) ; Nelles & King, Contempt By Publica-
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makes no specific mention of the summary power but early American
courts considered it to be inherent in their function and exercised it on
the authority of Blackstone.21 The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the
contemporaneous common law practice.2 2 Numerous abuses23 prompted
Congress to pass the Act of March 2, 183124 which was intended25 to
restrict the application of the summary power to certain enumerated
situations. All other contempts were to be tried before a jury.
Initially, the Act was acknowledged to curtail the theretofore un-
restricted use of the summary power by federal courts. 26 However, eighty-
seven years after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 27 said, "there can be no doubt that the
[Act of March 2, 1831] conferred no power not already granted and
imposed no limitation not already existing".28 Under this construction a
based, to some degree, on three articles written by Sir John Fox, which constitute the
definitive study of the history of contempt of court in England. Fox, The King v.
Almon, 24 L.Q. Rev. 266 (1908) ; Fox, The Summary Process To Punish Contempt,
25 L.Q. Rev. 238 (1909) ; Fox, The Writ Of Attachment, 40 L.Q. Rev. 43 (1924).
Fox's conclusion is that the statement of Blackstone, 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
283-84 (14th ed. 1796), which greatly influenced early American courts, that sum-
mary proceedings were "immemorially used" to punish both direct and indirect con-
tempts was at best a half-truth. Fox believed there was some evidence that direct
contempts were punishable by summary proceedings, but for the most part were treated
as ordinary crimes subject to indictment, presentment or arraignment. It was not
until the early sixteenth century that summary proceedings were employed. Their
use was accelerated by the advent of the Star Chamber (circa. 1500) which extended
summary proceedings to punish indirect contempt. The Star Chamber was abolished
in 1641, but "the atmosphere of corrupt and arbitrary practices which it had generated
partly survived." Frankfurter & Landis, supra at 1045. For an incisive treatment of
the entire problem, see Comment, 15 VAND. L. Rev. 241 (1961).
21. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
22. "And be it further enacted, that all the said courts of the United States
shall have power to . . . punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said
courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same .... Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
23. The most notable abuse was that committed by Judge James H. Peck against
one Luke Lawless. Lawless wrote a newspaper article criticial of Peck after un-
successfully arguing a case before him. Peck held him in contempt, sentenced him
to one day in prison and suspended him from practice for eighteen months. Lawless
petitioned Congress to impeach Peck. The House of Representatives brought articles
of impeachment, but the Senate voted against conviction. The next day the bill which
eventually became the Act of March 2, 1831, was introduced before the House. See
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 44-48 (1941).
24. "The power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments
and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to
extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in the presences
of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the
misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and
the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness,
or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command of the said courts." Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487.
25. The directions given the draftsmen were to "inquire into the expediency of
defining by statute all offenses which may be punished as contempts of the court or
the United States and also to limit the punishment for the same." 7 CONG. DEB., 21st
Cong., 2d Sess. 96 0 - 6 1 (1831). See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47 (1941).
26. Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 1205 (No. 11,350) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835).
27. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
28. Id. at 418. This construction has been called an "amazing historical solecism."
Frankfurter & Landis, Power Of Congress Over Procedure In Criminal Contempts
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summary commitment for criminal contempt was upheld where the
defendant had published a newspaper report impugning the integrity of a
federal judge. To achieve this result, the court interpreted "misbehavior
* . . so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . ."
in a causal rather than geographic sense. This construction rejuvenated
the long arm of the federal courts by allowing summary punishment
wherever there was a finding of "obstruction." Toledo was reversed in
the landmark decision of Nye v. United States 9 which held that while
fraudulently inducing a plaintiff to dismiss a suit was a criminal contempt,
it could not be punished by summary proceedings since the act alleged
was committed one hundred miles from the courtroom. "So near thereto"
was construed to mean nearness in a physical or geographic rather than
causal sense. The effect of this decision was to limit the summary power
in indirect contempt cases to those described in section 268 of the Judicial
Code.
30
Where criminal contempts were within the legitimate purview of the
summary power of the federal courts, distinctions were drawn concerning
their proper disposition. In Ex parte Terry"' an attorney, summarily
committed after physically attacking a court officer in open court, argued
that he was entitled to notice and a hearing. His commitment was affirmed
on the ground that violent interference with court proceedings necessitates
immediate judicial action in order to protect the authority and dignity of
the court. The delivery of a scurrilous letter to a federal judge accusing
him of bias in a suit of interest to the contemnor was held not to be
punishable by summary commitment in Cooke v. United States32 on the
theory that immediate retribution was not imperative. Terry was dis-
tinguished on its facts since the contempt there was in open court and
a violent interference with court proceedings. The Court directed that on
remand the contemnor should have notice and a hearing at which he
could have counsel and the right to present a defense.33 It is instructive
to note that both courts considered the character of the criminal contempt
to be as significant as its locus. Rule 42(a), however, which is asserted
by the draftsmen to be a codification of these cases34 makes the locus
of the contempt the only material consideration in determining whether
summary commitment will lie.35
The above cases illustrate that from the inception of the federal
courts, decisional law has focused on the extent of the summary power
rather than the legitimacy of its existence. In recent years, however,
members of the "activist" or liberal school of the Supreme Court have
29. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
30. Section 268 of the Judicial Code of 1912, 36 Stat. 1087, 1163, was substan-
tially the same as section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1831. See note 51 in!ra.
31. 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
32. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
33. See note 17 supra.
34. Advisory Committee Notes, note to subdivision (a), F9D. R. CRIM. P. 42
(1946).
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questioned the constitutionality of summary proceedings in criminal con-
tempts.3 6 Led by Justices Black and Douglas, a minority of the Court
has called for a re-evaluation of the summary power and urged the adoption
of two guiding principles: 1) criminal contempts are crimes and the
Constitution requires a jury trial; 2) observance of minimal standards
of procedural due process requires that all criminal contemnors be granted
a summary trial under Rule 42(b).
Dissents filed in Sacher v. United States,37 Green v. United States,38
and United States v. Barnett9 have given clarity and force to this posi-
tion.40 In Sacher the summary commitment of an attorney found guilty
of criminal contempt for contumacious conduct during a prolonged trial4'
was affirmed. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, was troubled by the fact
that a judge who had participated in and possibly precipitated the
acrimonious wrangling that marked the relations between bench and bar
during the trial should pass judgment on the guilt of the alleged con-
temnor.42  Going beyond the competency of the judge, Black proposed
that summary proceedings should not be employed to enforce unconditional
punishment in criminal contempt cases in view of article II, section 2 of
36. See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963).
37. 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952).
38. 356 U.S. 165, 196 (1958).
39. 376 U.S. 681, 724 (1964).
40. Within the past twenty-five years the Supreme Court has considered an un-
precedented number of summary contempt cases. The following is a chronicle of those
here pertinent: Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Fisher v.
Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) ; In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) ; Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) ; Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927 (1953) ; Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; Cammer
v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956) ; Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) ;
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) ; Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165
(1958) ; Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) ; Levine v. United States, 362
U.S. 610 (1960) ; In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) ; Panico v. United States, 375
U.S. 29 (1963) ; United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
41. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The defendants were
charged with conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the United States
government.
42. The voluminous trial transcript was in itself an impediment to proper appellate
review. Mr. Justice Black, however, concluded from certain quoted excerpts that
perhaps the trial judge allowed his repugnance for the offense charged to color his
attitude toward the defendants' attorneys. The trial judge was Harold R. Medina
who, of all men, should have been most sympathetic toward these attorneys in view of
the tension created by the notoriety of the trial. Judge Medina was himself a victim
of odium by association when he undertook to defend Anthony Cramer, who was
charged with treason during the Second World War. In Edward Bennett William's
ONE MAN'S FREEDOM (1962) the reflections of Medina on this incident are recounted:
after I had undertaken Cramer's defense I noticed that people generally and
my friends in particular . . . began to treat me with a certain coolness .... The
general public which thronged the courtroom every day of the trial indicated ...
very plainly that they thought perhaps we were in some way involved .... After
a recess one day I was walking up the aisle of the courtroom to the counsel
table when a spectator stood up and spat in my face. I think this is the worst
thing that ever happened to me in my whole life.
It would seem that if Judge Medina was unable to retain his objectivity during such
a trial, few men could. See Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1948) (affidavit
alleging prejudice of judge). All of which buttresses the argument that judges who
have become embroiled with attorneys during a trial and have charged them with
contempt should be disqualified from passing on their guilt under Rule 42(a). See
also Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 592 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
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the Constitution ("The trial of all Crimes .. .shall be by Jury . . .") and
the fifth amendment ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment and indictment of a
Grand Jury . . ."). He allowed that summary proceedings are proper
to enforce obedience and order in extreme situations but not if utilized to
mete out unconditional prison terms. In Green he elaborated on this
theme and made explicit what he had implied in Sacher. The charge
in Green was for indirect contempt resulting from the defendants' failure
to obey a court order. Writing again in dissent, Black reiterated his
position in Sacher and elucidated the legitimate use of summary pro-
ceedings:
perhaps it should be here emphasized that we are not at all con-
cerned with the power of courts to impose conditional imprisonment
for the purpose of compelling a person to obey a valid order. Such
coercion, where the defendant carries the keys to freedom in his
willingness to comply with the court's directive is essentially a civil
remedy for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been
exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees ...
In my judgment the distinction between conditional confinement to
compel future performance and unconditional imprisonment designed
to punish past transgressions is crucial, analytically as well as his-
torically, in determining the permissible mode of trial under the
Constitution.
43
In addition to the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, Mr.
Justice Black cited two practical considerations militating against the
need for summary proceedings in criminal contempts. Where the con-
temptuous acts are committed outside the court or where the contempt
in facie consists of conduct from which several inferences can be drawn,
there are factual questions which the judge by reason of his geographical
remoteness or personal temperament might not be best qualified to deter-
mine.4 4 Moreover, "when all that remains is punishment for past sins
' 45
there is no cogent reason for ignoring due process in the name of
celerity. In Barnett Governor Ross Barnett argued that he was entitled
to a jury trial for an alleged indirect criminal contempt brought on by
his refusal to comply with a federal court order concerning the admission
of James Meredith, a Negro, to the University of Mississipi. The Court
held the summary power to be inherent in the federal courts, as modified
by statute, and outside the guarantees of the Constitution concerning
"crimes." Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Douglas dissented on the
ground that if the summary power is to be allowed it should be restricted
43. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (dissenting opinion of
Black, J.).
44. "It transcends recognized frailties of human nature to suppose that a judge
can be free from the inclinations arising from natural pique which would be engen-
dered by a direct refusal by the accused to obey an order freshly made by him, and
the temptation to strike back which inevitably accompanies ruffled pride." Ballantyne
v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 1956).
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to minor punishments for petty offenses. Mr. Justice Black, in a separate
dissent, delivered his most critical assessment of the summary power to
date: "It is high time, in my judgment, to wipe out root and branch the
judge-invented and judge-maintained notion that judges can try criminal
contempt cases without a jury. 46
With these considerations in mind, the present case should be viewed
against a backdrop of the protracted struggle waged by the "activists"
to hobble the contempt power juxtaposed with the prevailing reluctance
to violate a prerogative asserted to be grounded in the nature of the
judicial institution.
The narrow holding of Harris which refuses to sanction the use of
Rule 42(a) to punish a compulsory re-enactment before the district court
of the petitioner's contemptuous refusal to answer the grand jury's ques-
tions is long overdue and is in keeping with the universally accepted policy
of construing Rule 42(a) strictly.47 The legitimate uses48 of such a special
proceeding should not be distorted to deprive a contemnor of his rights
under Rule 42 (b).
49
When the Court goes beyond this holding and assumes arguendo that
Rule 42(a) may at times be applicable to contempts committed at such
46. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 727 (1964) (dissenting opinion of
Black, J.).
47. This decision in no way changes the established construction of 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(l) (note 51 infra) that contempts committed before the grand jury are within
the summary contempt power. All that is disallowed is utilizing Rule 42(a) to punish
the second contemptuous refusal to answer questions propounded before the grand
jury and then repeated before the special district court proceeding. Ordinarily, there
must be two refusals to answer before the grand jury if the witness is to be held in
contempt. If when a question is submitted to him for the first time, the witness in
good faith refuses to answer on the ground of privilege, he is not in contempt. In
most cases he will be taken before the district court where a hearing will be held to
determine the availability of privilege. If the court rules that he must answer the
question, then any subsequent refusal will be a contempt. Calomeris v. District of
Columbia, 226 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
For a consideration of the availability of the fifth amendment privilege to witnesses
before a grand jury, see Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 236 (1951).
48. Such legitimate uses include the imposition of coercion to encourage the wit-
ness to answer as well as the opportunity given to the contemnor to purge himself.
49. While it is clear from the holding that the Court takes a jaundiced view of
staging a contempt of court in the name of expedience, its analysis is veiled by cryptic
references to the place of the "real" contempt as well as to proceedings that are
"ancillary" to a grand jury hearing. Several alternatives are proposed: (1) petitioner's
refusal was in contempt of the district court but not a contempt of the kind envisioned
by Rule 42(a) ; (2) petitioner's refusal was in contempt of the ditsrict court but was
inseparable from his contempt before the grand jury and could not be punished without
reference to its origin; (3) petitioner's refusal before the district court was not
properly a contempt since the only "real" contempt was before the grand jury. It is
submitted that had the Court pursued this latter line of reasoning the opinion might
have more lucidly revealed the frailty of the district court proceeding. Since dis-
obedience to the order of the court must in some way "obstruct" the administration
of justice to be a contempt, the Court might have reasoned that since the admitted
purpose of the special proceeding was to compel the petitioner to commit a contempt
before the district judge, it could hardly be said that his refusal there "obstructed"
the administration of justice. Rather than impeding the court's business, the refusal
fulfilled the purpose of the proceeding and expedited the business at hand, that is, to
punish the petitioner. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945), for a similar analysis
concerning the impropriety of treating perjury as contempt of court.
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testimonial episodes, it alludes to a rationale for its decision that imports
an ambivalent judicial attitude toward summary contempt.
The Court describes contempts envisioned by Rule 42(a) as "mis-
behavior" marked by "exceptional circumstances." Illustrative of such mis-
behavior are situations where disturbances must be quelled, insolent tactics
must be stopped, or acts threatening to the judge must be halted. Significant
by its absence from this litany, is the passive refusal to answer a question
or obey an order. Such disobedience to the lawful command of the court
has heretofore been punishable under Rule 42(a) if committed in the actual
presence of the court.5 ° By stating that Rule 42(a) is reserved for mis-
behavior, which is the word used in sections 401(1) and 401(2) of title
18,51 and omitting from examples given of such misbehavior those con-
tempts punishable by summary proceedings characterized as "disobedience"
in section 401(3), the Court has indicated that Rule 42(a) might not
apply to all criminal contempts committed in the actual presence of the
court. While interpreting the Court's intention from its omissions has
obvious deficiences, it can be safely said that under the Court's analysis
the character of a criminal contempt prosecuted under Rule 42(a), as well
as its locus, will come under scrutiny.5 2
It is clear from the opinion, however, that Justices Black and Douglas
have impressed a majority of the Court with their arguments concerning the
imperativeness of according all criminal contemnors the minimum right of
summary. trial under Rule 42(b). Cooke v. United States5 3 is cited for the
proposition that in indirect contempt cases, due process requires that the
accused should have the right to bring forth evidence "either to the issue
of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense."'5 4 Adducing
exculpatory evidence for contempt committed in facie has always been
regarded as superfluous since the judge himself witnessed the contempt and
knows all the relevant facts. However, even in contempts committed in
facie the judge does not necessarily know all the facts that might tend to
mitigate guilt. Such facts may be present in any contempt, but the Court
finds the refusal of a witness to testify before a grand jury to be a situation
in which their presence is quite likely. The Court states, "what appears
50. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1962) is based on 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1940), Judicial Code
and Judiciary, Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 268, 36 Stat. 1163, which in turn was derived
from the Act of March 2, 1831, c. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487. It provides as follows:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree,
or command.
52. See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 237 (1962) (dissenting opinion of
Harlan, J.) where Mr. Justice Harlan interpreted the majority opinion (by Black, J.)
as saying "only a physical obstruction of pending judicial proceedings is punishable
under 18 U.S.C. § 401." Id. at 237.
53. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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to be a brazen refusal to cooperate with the grand jury may indeed be a
case of frightened silence. Refusal to answer may be due to fear - fear of
reprisals on the witness or his family. Other extenuating circumstances
may be present." 55 This analysis should pari ratione apply to any criminal
contempt, even those involving "exceptional circumstances." The Court
has already considered a case where the contemnor's "insolent tactics"
were possibly due to mental imbalance.56 In absence of the protections
accorded a contemnor under Rule 42 (b), such facts might never be brought
to the attention of the court.
The Court offers another description of contempts envisioned by Rule
42(a) by calling them "unusual situations .. . where instant action is
necessary to protect the judicial institution. '"5 7 While this is of little value
as an analytic tool, it does illuminate an abstract proposition quoted in
the opinion that urges limiting the power to punish for contempt to the
"least possible power adequate to the end proposed."58 If the Court is
suggesting that the "end proposed" is the protection of the judicial institu-
tion, then it does not necessarily follow that the least possible power to
achieve this end, even in the case of threatening a judge, should be an
exercise of the summary commitment power under Rule 42(a). The court
and judge would receive ample protection if the contemnor were to be
removed from the courtroom and provisionally detained until a hearing
under Rule 42(b) might be held.59 However, historically the protection
of the judicial institution has always been thought to require immediate
vindication so as to restore swiftly the affronted dignity of the court. This
immediate vindication has traditionally taken the form of instantaneous
punishment for a fixed term.
The Court's desire to curtail the summary commitment power in cases
of contemptuous refusal to testify is manifest, but it is questionable whether
a narrow construction of Rule 42(a) will suffice to meet this end. Since
the Court's reasoning applies only to criminal contempts and refusals to
testify may also be civil contempts, it is apparent that circumvention of the
holding in the instant case is a distinct possibility. Due to the lack of a
clear ratio decidendi in Harris the contemptuous refusal of a grand jury
witness to answer before a special district court proceeding might still be a
direct civil contempt and within the common law summary commitment
55. 382 U.S. at 166.
56. Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963) where a criminal defendant was
found guilty under Rule 42(a) of contemptuous conduct in open court despite the
earlier introduction of conflicting testimony concerning his mental capacity to stand
trial. His conviction was vacated and remanded for proceedings under Rule 42(b)
after the Court noted that a prison psychiatrist had found him suffering from schizo-
phrenia and had committed him to a mental hospital.
57. 382 U.S. at 167.
58. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821).
59. A similar procedure was urged by Edward Livingston in his PROPOSED PENAL
CODE ov LouISIANA (1824) which never gained legislative approval. See Frankfurter
& Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"
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power. 0° In this case the contemnor could be imprisoned, albeit con-
ditionally, without an opportunity to bring forth evidence in extenuation.
Even under Mr. Justice Black's theory6' such imprisonment might not be
objectionable since the contemnor would be "coerced" not "punished" and
would "carry the keys" to his cell. Whether coercion really differs from
punishment where the contemnor is too fearful of reprisals to answer is
questionable.62 While it cannot be gainsaid that a court ought to have the
power to compel compliance with its lawful order, it is submitted that the
propriety of a particular method of exercising it should not turn upon the
purpose in employing it. It is distressing that even though punishment of a
past act of refusal necessitates a hearing, coercing future obedience does not.
The instant case stands as a compromise to attract a consensus among
a majority of the Court and despite its deficiencies acts as a useful
barometer to reflect the extent to which the Court is currently willing to
reduce the summary contempt power. By restricting the purview of Rule
42(a) some progress has been made to this end. It is hoped that further
inroads may be made into a judicial power to imprison that is as antithetical
to due process as it is unique.
Thomas Colas Carroll
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ANNULMENT - CONCEALMENT OF ANTI-
SEMITIC BELIEFS IS SUFFICIENT FRAUD FOR ANNULMENT.
Kober v. Kober (N.Y. 1965)
Plaintiff wife sued defendant husband for annulment on the grounds
of fraud. Plaintiff alleged that, before marriage, defendant falsely and
fraudulently concealed from her that he had been an officer in the German
Army and a member of the Nazi Party during World War II, and that
he was fanatically anti-Semitic, believed in the extermination of the Jewish
people, and would require plaintiff to "weed out" her Jewish friends and
cease socializing with them. Plaintiff further alleged that she would not
have married defendant if she had known of his prejudices. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed the decision of the
trial court denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an allegation of
concealment of anti-Sematic beliefs prior to marriage sufficiently states a
cause of action for annulment. Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d
817 (1965).
60. See note 51 supra.
61. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
62. Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44,
56-57 (1961) ; see Comment, 57 YALE, L.J. 83, 95 (1947), where similarities between




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Under basic contract law, a contract may be rescinded (annulled) on
the ground of fraud if it can be shown that the fraud consists of a mis-
representation of material fact made with intent to induce another to enter
into the agreement, and in fact accomplishes that result.1 Since the marriage
relationship is based fundamentally upon the law of contracts, 2 it follows
that it should be voidable when induced by fraud. However, because of
the importance of the marriage contract and the status established thereby,
most courts have been reluctant to determine the validity of marriages by
the rules governing ordinary civil contracts.8 Thus, while fraud has been
recognized as a valid ground for annulment, public policy has dictated great
restriction upon its application. This restrictive application was first em-
bodied in the essentialia or ecclesiastical doctrine4 under which a marriage
would be annulled on grounds of fraud only if the fraud concerned some-
thing essential to the marriage, that is, ". . . something making impossible
the performance of the duties and obligations of that relation or rendering
its assumption and continuance dangerous to health or life." 5
The essentialia doctrine has found favor in most American jurisdic-
tions and, prior to 1903, was steadfastly adhered to in New York.6 How-
ever, the increasing pressure exerted upon the New York courts by that
state's single-ground divorce law 7 eventually gave rise to the abandonment
of the essentialia doctrine in the case of di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo., In that
case plaintiff alleged that he had been induced to marry defendant by her
fraudulent representation that he was the father of her child. The Court
of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, held that plaintiff's complaint stated
a cause of action for annulment on the ground of fraud, saying that mar-
riage is not to be considered in any other light than a civil contract and
that "there is no valid reason for excepting the marriage contract from the
general rule . . ." which, read literally, would justify annulment of a
marriage for any misrepresentation of material fact made with intent to
induce another to enter into a marriage. Thus, di Lorenzo seemed to place
annulment for fraud within the general rules applicable to ordinary com-
mercial contracts.
1. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941).
2. See 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 167 (6th ed. 1881).
3. See Crouch, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud in New York, 6 CORNtLL L.Q.
401 (1921).
4. For a discussion of the ecclesiastical and early common law rule, see Fessenden,
Nullity of Marriage, 13 HARV. L. REv. 110 (1899).
5. Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 368, 82 N.E. 850, 852 (1907). Generally, the courts
have held that the misrepresentations must have been as to facts concerning con-
sortium or cohabitation. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N.E. 933 (1898)
Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 Atl. 1029 (1894).
6. Fisk v. Fisk, 6 App. Div. 432, 39 N.Y. Supp. 537 (1896) ; Klein v. Wolfsohn,
I Abb. N. Cas. 134 (1876).
7. Divorce is permitted only for adultery. N.Y. DoMESTIc RELATIONS LAW
§ 170. Other states were under no pressure to abandon the essentialia doctrine because
those problems which could not be resolved under the strict requirements of this
doctrine could be adequately solved by divorce laws permitting dissolution of marriage
on such grounds as mental cruelty, abandonment and the like.
8. 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
9. Id. at 472, 67 N.E. at 64.
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Subsequent decisions, however, proved that the New York courts were
most reluctant to apply the broad rule of di Lorenzo when to do so would
create a totally new basis on which to claim fraud.10 In an effort to
eliminate this reluctance, the Court of Appeals reenunciated the di Lorenzo
doctrine, emphasizing its meaning, in Shonfeld v. Shonfeld.11 In that case
plaintiff alleged that he had been induced into marriage by defendant's
fraudulent representations that she would furnish him with sufficient money
to enter into a certain business enterprise. Reversing the lower court, the
Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for
annulment. In reaching its decision the court stated, "any fraud is adequate
which is 'material, to that degree that, had it not been practiced, the party
deceived would not have consented to the marriage' and is 'of such a nature
as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person'."'1 2 The Shonfeld ruling seemed
to dispell any doubts as to what the New York test for annulment would be
in the future; New York courts were apparently to disregard any special
policy consideration and treat the marriage contract as they would any
other contract. To be sure, the courts became much more lenient in finding
sufficient fraud for annulment in the years following Shonfeld.13 It should
be noted, however, that there was still hesitation to treat the marriage
contract as having no greater significance than the ordinary civil contract.
Thus, misrepresentations as to character, temperament, social position and
financial status were not considered "material enough" to void the marriage
contract even under the Shonfeld ruling.
14
The di Lorenao-Shonfeld doctrine stood unchallenged in New York
for some nineteen years. However, in 1952 this doctrine was considerably
narrowed in the case of Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff.15
In that case plaintiff sued for annulment alleging that defendant had formed
a conspiracy with his brother to marry plaintiff and secure her wealth, and
that if she had known of this conspiracy she would not have consented to
marry defendant. Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals dis-
missed this complaint saying:
[B]ut this is a suit to annul a marriage for fraud, and, while we have,
for better or for worse, retreated . . .from the old idea that marriages
can be voided only for frauds going to the essentials of the marriage,
10. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 122 Misc. 837, 204 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1924), aff'd,
209 App. Div. 883, 205 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1924) (misrepresentations of love and affec-
tion held not sufficient grounds for annulment after the marriage was consummated) ;
Beckermeister v. Beckermeister, 170 N.Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (concealment of
motive to avoid prison on bastardy proceedings held insufficient).
11. 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933).
12. Id. at 479, 184 N.E. at 61, quoting in part from diLorenvo v. diLorenzo, 174
N.Y. 467, 471, 474, 67 N.E. 63, 64-65 (1903). (Emphasis added.)
13. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 156 Misc. 251, 281 N.Y. Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(concealment of motive to relieve financial distress held sufficient) ; Costello v.
Costello, 155 Misc. 28, 279 N.Y. Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (misrepresentation that
wife had never previously married held sufficient).
14. Cervone v. Cervone, 155 Misc. 543, 280 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(defendant's misrepresentation that he had a medical degree held insufficient) ; Smelzer
v. Smelzer, 147 Misc. 413, 265 N.Y. Supp. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (defendant's mis-
representations as to his financial position held insufficient).
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that is, consortium and cohabitation, it is, nonetheless, still the law in
New York that annulments are decreed, not for any and every kind of
fraud . . , but for fraud as to matters 'vital' to the marriage rela-
tionship only .... 16
Under a literal interpretation of the di Lorenzo-Shonfeld doctrine, plaintiff's
complaint might well have stated a cause of action; a jury could reasonably
have found that the fraud alleged was material to that degree that had it
not been practiced the party deceived would not have consented to the
marriage. Thus, while Woronzoff-Daschkoff did not purport to overrule
di Lorenzo or Shonfeld, it did narrow the scope of the rule laid down in
those cases insofar as it declared that to be sufficient for annulment the
fraud would have to go to something "vital" to the marriage relationship.
The New York Court of Appeals has had little opportunity since the
Woronzoff-Daschkoff case to explain what is to be considered "vital" to the
marriage. 17 Probably because of this, the lower courts of New York have,
for the most part, ignored the "vital to the marriage" concept and have
continued to apply the well established rules of di Lorenzo and Shonfeld.1
8
It might have been expected, then, that when the instant case came before
it, the Court of Appeals would have seized the opportunity to provide guide-
lines from which the lower courts might determine what things are "vital"
under the Woronzoff-Daschkoff rule. Instead, the court simply based its
decision upon di Lorenzo and Shonfeld, quoting extensively from each. The
court did pay lip service to the Woronzoff-Daschkoff doctrine, stating that
the representation had to relate to something "vital" to the marriage rela-
tionship, but it went on to say that if the representation were of such a
nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, then it would constitute
sufficient fraud for annulment. 19 It appears from this language that in the
instant case the court is reverting to the more liberal di Lorenzo-Shonfeld
doctrine.
It is important to note that throughout the history of annulment for
fraud in New York the courts have avoided determining whether plaintiff
reasonably relied upon the representation by a subjective test, that is, did
this particular plaintiff reasonably rely upon the representations made?
Instead, the courts have employed an objective test: would a reasonable
man have been deceived by the representations? Moreover, the courts have
delineated certain representations reliance upon which is per se unrea-
16. Id. at 511, 104 N.E.2d at 880.
17. It is not often that an annulment case is pursued to the highest court of
the state.
18. See Gambacorta v. Gambacorta, 136 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (defen-
dant's representation that she had divorced her former husband for cruelty when he
had actually divorced her for adultery held sufficient) ; Ciulla v. Ciulla, 207 Misc. 122,
136 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (defendant's representation that she had been
validly married to a former mate when in fact she had lived with him illicitly held
sufficient); Madden v. Madden, 204 Misc. 170, 125 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
(defendant's representations that he would stay home at night and not keep secrets
from his wife held sufficient because defendant had present intention not to abide by
these representations).
19. Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 211 N.E.2d 817, 821 (1965).
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sonable. Among these are misrepresentations as to character, tempera-
ment, and social or financial status. 20 It is reasoned that these particular
qualities are such as to demand inquiry before marriage.21 Since the
marriage relation contemplates a prior courtship period for the very pur-
pose of affording each party an opportunity to familiarize himself with
these elements of the other's background, it is assumed that the reasonably
prudent man would discover any misrepresentations as to them. The ground
for annulment asserted in the present case was the defendant's alleged
misrepresentation that he held no anti-Semitic beliefs. This would un-
deniably be classified under the heading of character or temperament. In
fact, the plaintiff's complaint expressly classified it as such. Plaintiff alleged
that she relied upon defendant's ". . . apparent normal character, high
moral beliefs and absence of fanatic anti-Semitism .... ,,2 Yet, the court
concluded that this is sufficient to state a cause of action. The court can
only be holding that a misrepresentation as to character is sufficient fraud
for annulment.
The obvious question is why the court found the misrepresentation in
the present case sufficient to vitiate the marriage while representations as
to character are generally held not sufficient. It is submitted that the repre-
sentation in the instant case was not merely one as to a particular char-
acter trait, rather it was such as to present defendant as a wholly different
individual from the one he really was. There is a pivotal difference between
a misrepresentation as to a character trait and a misrepresentation as to
identity. It must be remembered that the presence or absence of consent is
the key to whether a marriage will be annulled for fraud. When a party
misrepresents a character trait to another and so induces marriage, the
deceived party is in fact consenting to marry the party making the repre-
sentations, though he may be deceived as to a facet of his character. When
a party misrepresents his identity, that is, his whole character, the deceived
party is not consenting to marry the party making the representations, but
the individual he represents himself to be. To illustrate, when party A
represents himself to be a totally different person so that to the party
deceived A is not A at all, but B, the deceived party's consent is not to
marry A, but B. It would follow that since there was no consent to marry
A, and since the existence vel non of a marriage depends upon the presence
of consent, the non-consenting party may have the marriage annulled.
In the case of Harris v. Harris23 the New York Court of Appeals found
defendant's concealment of his past criminal activities sufficient grounds
for annulment. In doing so, the court implied that here was not simply
a misrepresentation of character traits, but something more. However,
the court, did not discuss the nature of the "something more." It is clear,
however, that, as in the instant case, the representation was one going to
20. See, e.g., Cervone v. Cervone, 155 Misc. 543, 280 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
21. Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 911 (1930).
22. Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 193, 211 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1965).
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the total personality of the deceiving party. The plaintiff believed she was
consenting to marry a law-abiding individual, not a hardened criminal.
Under this analysis the court's test would be formulated as follows: when
a representation is such as to indicate that the deceiving party is a wholly
different person from the one he actually is, there is sufficient fraud
for annulment.
The problem that remains is how to predict what the court will con-
sider a misrepresentation of the total personality. Comparison of Harris
with the instant case reveals that in both situations the defendants' mis-
representation concealed an anti-social or depraved character. So it seems
clear that if a defendant conceals such a character an annulment will be
granted. But what if the defendant misrepresents his entire personality
and that personality is not a depraved one? The foregoing analysis, which
was not expressly used by the court, would logically call for annulment
whether the true nature was depraved or not, as long as it made of defen-
dant a different kind of person than he represented himself to be. It is a
matter of conjecture, however, whether the court would grant an annul-
ment where the deceiving party is not depraved.
The instant decision was certainly equitable, and it has been shown
that it was logically and legally justified. But it should not be overlooked
that in any New York annulment case there lurks the spectre of the single
ground divorce law. The actual reasoning of the court in the instant case
emphasized the intolerable situation in which plaintiff was living and the
inequity of abandoning her to remain in it. "Intolerableness" and "inequity"
are rather vague concepts; as criteria for granting annulments they would
be highly subjective. It is submitted that if the instant decision had been
based on a clearer legal anaysis, like the one herein suggested, it would have
provided a more useful guide for New York's lower courts.
Lee Sherman
EVIDENCE - EXPERT WITNESSES - MEDICAL TREATISES UPON
WHICH EXPERT WITNESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY RELIED MAY BE
USED IN CROSS-EXAMINING HIM.
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp. (Ill. 1965)
Plaintiff, a minor, instituted an action against defendant hospital to
recover for alleged negligent medical and hospital treatment which necessi-
tated the amputation of his leg. During the trial the defendant called as its
witnesses a doctor and a superintendent of a hospital in another county.
The trial judge permitted plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine these wit-
nesses with respect to certain statements in medical texts. Defendant's
experts had not cited these works as bases for their opinions, but they
SPRING 1966]
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1966], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss3/9
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
admitted on cross-examination that the books were a part of their general
background knowledge. After a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the cross-examination of its medical
experts on treatises upon which they had not expressly relied in their direct
testimony was improper. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the cross-examination
was proper since the record showed that the experts had based their
opinions on these treatises.' The Supreme Court of Illinois also affirmed
but in doing so refused to decide whether the inferior appellate court had
properly followed the prior Illinois rule that an expert must expressly base
his opinion on a treatise before it can be used against him. Instead, the
court adopted the so-called liberal view and held that authoritative learned
treatises may be employed in cross-examination of an expert witness even
though the witness did not purport to base his opinion on such authorities.
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965).
The use of expert witnesses, an exception to the normal ban on opinion
evidence,2 has an important position in any litigation concerning technical
or highly complicated areas. Because of the expert's exalted position, his
testimony has an important bearing on the outcome of many cases. In
order to reduce the effectiveness of this evidence, trial attorneys use various
methods of cross-examination. One method is to attack the expert's train-
ing and special competency. 3 Another is to question the interest or bias
of the witness with special attention given to whether the expert has received
compensation over and above the normal witness fees. 4 The most effective
method of challenging the expert's testimony, however, is to employ learned
treatises5 in cross-examining him. 6 By using such books the cross-
examiner attacks the witness' opinion itself showing it to be either incon-
sistent with the witness' prior writing, if the book was written by the
expert, or based upon an improper reading of the authorities, where the
book is one expressly relied upon by the witness, or inconsistent with the
views of eminent authorities, where the book was not relied upon by the
witness. Successful employment of a treatise in any of these cases indicates
to the jury in a very dramatic and impressive fashion that the expert's
opinion is either false or ill-considered.
Although lay society generally recognizes the value of treatises and
textbooks as a medium of scientific knowledge, the use of such works in
courts of law has been the source of much conflict. If treatises were allowed
1. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 I11. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964).
2. See 2 JoNts, EVIDENCE § 415 (5th ed. 1958).
3. E.g., Gresham, Cross-Examination of The Medical Witness, 29 INS. COUNMSE
J. 252 (1962) ; Trial Tactics in Handling The Medical Expert Witness, 29 TENN. L.
RI.v. 208 (1962).
4. See State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 671, 51 S.E.2d 348, 355 (1949).
5. Hereinafter referred to as treatises.
6. See Willens, Cross-Examining the Expert Witness with the Aid of Books,
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in as direct substantive evidence, the source of this confusion would dis-
appear. But to so allow them would be violative of the hearsay rule since
they are out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Many legal commentators have urged that authoritative treatises be allowed
in as direct evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule.7 The rationale
for creating this exception is that the author is normally unavailable or,
if he is available, the cost of bringing him into court would be prohibitive.
Moreover, there is a high degree of probability that authors who write for
the purpose of passing on knowledge to students and practitioners are
trustworthy.8 The response to this scholarly advice has been meager: to
date only one state has carved out such an exception by judicial decision.9
Several other states have statutes which permit the use of treatises as
substantive evidence in certain specified instances. 10 In addition, a number
of jurisdictions have statutes which declare scientific books to be prima facie
evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest," but, under the theory
that medicine is an inexact science, the courts of these latter states have
held that the statutes do not sanction the admission of medical texts.
12
The greatest confusion exists in the area of the use of treatises as tools
for cross-examination. The reason for the bewilderment is that courts can-
not agree on how to limit the use of these texts to non-hearsay purposes.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that many cases do not even recognize
a hearsay problem, basing their holdings on precedent which also ignored
this issue. Those courts which do mention the problem can be classified
broadly according to the extent to which they permit the use of treatises
on cross-examination. However, it must be remembered that the lines be-
tween classes are not clear ones, and that the same jurisdiction may adopt
different rules in different cases or at different times.
There are several ways in which a treatise may be employed to cross-
examine an expert witness. The attorney may read from the treatise and
ask the witness if he agrees or disagrees with it.1 3 The attorney may hand
the book to the witness and ask him to find the passage or passages which
sustain his opinion.' 4 Some jurisdictions allow the cross-examiner to read
7. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63 (31) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 529
(1942) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1690-92 (3d ed. 1940) ; Dana, Admission of Learned
Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. Riv. 455. But see Grubb, Proposed "Learned
Treatises" Rule, 1946 Wis. L. REv. 81.
8. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1691-92 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Smarr v. State, 260 Ala. 30, 68 So. 2d 6 (1953) ; Stoudenmeier v. Williamson,
29 Ala. 558 (1857).
10. In Massachusetts and Nevada relevant statements of fact or opinion contained
in medical books and treatises of an authoritative nature are admissible in actions
for medical malpractice. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (1959) ; NEv. REv.
STAT. § 51.040 (1957). In South Carolina relevant medical books may be introduced
to complement expert testimony in cases where sanity or the administration of poison
or any other article destructive to life is in issue. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
11. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1936; IOWA CODE § 622.23 (1946).
12. Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98 (1949) ; Wilcox v.
Crumpton, 219 Iowa 389, 258 N.W. 704 (1935); Bixby v. Omaha & Council Bluffs
Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898).
13. Scullin v. Vining, 127 Ark. 124, 191 S.W. 924 (1917) ; Bowles v. Bourbon,
219 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
14. Kersten v. Great Northern Ry., 28 N.D. 3, 147 N.W. 787 (1914).
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the contradictory extract directly to the jury.15 The method selected in
any case depends primarily on the effect sought to be obtained by use of
the treatise and the personal preference of the cross-examiner.
Nearly all jurisdictions allow the use of a treatise written by the
testifying expert in order to show that his previous writing is contrary to
what he has stated on direct examination. Thus, the purpose of using the
treatise in such a case is to impeach the credibility of the witness by means
of a prior inconsistent statement, a traditionally non-hearsay use.16 Prac-
tically all courts also permit the use of treatises where the expert admits
he has specifically relied on them. Since the purpose of using treatises in
this instance is to show that the expert was incorrect in his interpretation
of the authorities and not to prove the truth of the material contained in
them, this use is purely one of impeachment of credibility. Many courts,
termed strict jurisdictions by some commentators, limit the use of treatises
to these two situations only.' 7 In Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry.1s the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that a physician who based his opinion on his own
observations and experience, without relying on any text-books or writers
on the subject, could not be cross-examined by reference to medical treatises.
In reaching this result the court indicated one of the basic reasons for the
strict rule by quoting the following from City of Bloomington v. Shrock :19
[W]here a witness simply gives his opinion as to the proper treat-
ment of a given disease or injury, and a book is produced recommend-
ing a different treatment, at most the repugnance is not of fact, but
of theory; and any number of additional books expressing different
theories would obviously be quite as competent as the first. But, since
the books are not admissible as original evidence in such cases, it must
follow that they are not admissible on cross-examination, where their
introduction is not for the direct contradiction of something asserted
by the witness, but simply to prove a contrary theory.
20
Under the so-called liberal rule, authoritative treatises may be used in
cross-examination of experts whether or not the expert has made refer-
ence to them or purports to rely on them. 21 These jurisdictions reason that
since experts base much of their opinion on book knowledge, it would be
illogical, if not actually unfair, to deprive the party challenging such evi-
dence of all opportunity to interrogate them about divergent opinions.
An example of the liberal approach is found in Laird v. Boston & M.R.R.
22
In that case the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that an expert
must of necessity base his opinion on hearsay and whether it shall be
15. E.g., Madsen v. Oberrnann, 237 Iowa 461, 22 N.W.2d 350 (1946).
16. See La Count v. General Asbestos & Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E.
262 (1937).
17. See Wall v. Weaver, 145 Col. 337, 358 P.2d 1009 (1961) ; see also collection
of cases at Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77, 83 (1958).
18. 265 Ill. 338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914).
19. 110 11. 219 (1884).
20. Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry., 265 Ill. 338, 342, 106 N.E. 828, 829 (1914).
21. See Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 481 (1948); see
also collection of cases at Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77, 87 (1958).
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admitted or not depends upon the expert's familiarity with the hearsay.
When the witness is confronted with the contents of books that contradict
the view he has expressed, the issue presented is not whether the book
states the true opinion of the author, but whether the witness has honestly
and intelligently read and applied what is set down in the books.
23
Between the strict view and the liberal view exists a strong middle
ground which allows the introduction of treatises on cross-examination of
an expert where he has admitted that the texts are authoritative. 24 The
reason for this rule was expressed in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Nixon2 r5 as follows:
When a doctor testifies as an expert relative to injuries or dis-
eases, he may be asked to identify a given work as a standard authority
on the subject involved; and if he so recognizes it, excerpts therefrom
may be read not as original evidence but solely to discredit his testi-
mony or to test its weight.
26
Courts following the liberal and middle approaches allowing the use
of treatises on cross-examination though the expert has not expressly
relied on them, assert that the inquiry is into the extent of the expert's
knowledge, his competency, and the accuracy of his conclusions.2 7 They
reason that when treatises are used for this purpose, they are not being
employed to prove the truth of the matter contained in them. This is so
because where the cross-examiner presents to the jury several treatises all
of which disagree with the opinion of the expert witness and with each other,
the jury is asked to believe only that there is a conflict of authority in the
area and that no one opinion should be given decisive weight. And where
several treatises are introduced all of which express the same opinion,
which opinion is different from the one expressed by the witness, the jury
is asked to believe either again that there is a conflict of authority or that
the witness does not know of these treatises and therefore did not base his
opinion on consideration of all the relevant authorities so that his con-
clusion may be inaccurate, and, in fact, he may be incompetent to testify
on the subject. Courts following the strict view fear that to permit an
expert to be tested by statements in a treatise upon which he has not
expressly relied is indirectly to get the contents of the statements before
the jurors who will ignore any instruction from the bench to consider the
treatise only for impeachment of credibility and consider the statements in
the books as direct evidence. It cannot be denied that this fear has some basis
in fact. Jurors are probably incapable of the mental gymnastics required to
consider treatises strictly for impeachment purposes. 28 So, as a practical
23. Id. at 592.
24. See Ruth v. Fenchel, 21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956); see also collection
of cases at Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77, 94 (1958).
25. 328 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
26. Id. at 812.
27. See Ruud v. Hendrickson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N.W. 904 (1929).
28. In this respect, see Landro v. Great Northern Ry., 117 Minn. 306, 309, 135
N.W. 991, 992 (1912), where the court considered that reading extracts from treatises
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matter, there is real danger that the jury will consider an out-of-court state-
ment not made under oath as evidence of a particular fact in the case.
In the instant case the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the position
it had taken in the Ulirich case in favor of the liberal view that an expert
may be cross-examined on any treatise that is authoritative. The court
indicated that in order to establish an author's competence the judge may
take judicial notice of it or it may be established by the testimony of a
witness expert in the subject.29 In justifying its decision the court stated:
An individual becomes an expert by studying and absorbing a
body of knowledge. To prevent cross-examination upon the relevant
body of knowledge serves only to protect the ignorant or unscrupulous
expert witness. In our opinion expert testimony will be a more effec-
tive tool in the attainment of justice if cross-examination is permitted
as to the views of recognized authorities, expressed in treatises or
periodicals written for professional colleagues.30
Although the present court casts its lot with the courts following the
liberal view, it does not appear to have followed the rationale used by those
courts which maintain that the liberal approach involves no hearsay viola-
tion. Indeed, there are good grounds for speculation that the court is
willing in a proper case to allow an exception to the hearsay rule which
would permit the introduction of treatises in evidence. For example, it is
interesting to note the court's strong reliance on commentators who propose
that treatises be admitted as exceptions. 81 In addition, the court stated that
even though its former rule was supported by the considerations which
support the hearsay rule, it has been convincingly demonstrated that these
considerations are not applicable to scientific works.8
2
The court's reliance on these authorities invites a comparison between
the rule adopted in the instant case, that is, that treatises found to be
authoritative by the judge may be used in cross-examination of an expert
whether or not he has relied on them and the rule, adopted only in Alabama,
that treatises may be introduced as direct evidence. Many arguments have
been offered against the latter rule. Primary among these is that it involves
a violation of the hearsay rule. 8 In fact, admission of any book in evidence
involves a double hearsay problem. The party offering such evidence makes
two assertions: (1) the book was actually written by the author named in
its initial pages and actually expresses his views, (2) the statements quoted
from the book are factually correct. The first of these problems is solved
when the book is authenticated; before the book can be used at all the
judge must determine that the book was actually written by its ostensible
29. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 335, 211
N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965).
30. Id. at 335, 211 N.E.2d at 259.
31. E.g., UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENcE 63(31) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 529
(1942) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 296 (1954) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1690-92
(3d ed. 1940).
32. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 335, 211
N.E.2d 253, 259 (1965).
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author and it naturally follows from an affirmative finding on this question
that the book expresses the author's views. As for the second problem,
the argument of legal scholars that there exists sufficient need and reliability
to create an exception to the hearsay rule which would permit the intro-
duction of treatises in evidence has already been set out above. 34 If the
arguments of these scholars are accepted, the hearsay rule is no bar to the
admission of treatises as direct evidence. Since the court in the instant case
seemed to concede that its new rule involved a violation of the hearsay
rule and cited with approval authorities recommending a hearsay excep-
tion for treatises, it seems clear that the instant court would not object
on hearsay grounds to adopting the Alabama rule.
It has also been objected that the technical language in which most
treatises are written would confuse the jury.88 This problem, however,
could be remedied by a requirement that treatises could be admitted in
evidence only to complement the testimony of an expert present in court.86
The expert would thus be available to explain the technical language under
oath and subject to cross-examination. However, in so far as the Alabama
rule is designed to save the trouble and expense of bringing an expert into
court its purpose is defeated by this qualification. It has further been
objected that passages might be quoted out of context with the result that
the jury would be misled. 7 However, the book would be available for
examination by opposing counsel or an expert testifying for the opposing
party and any quotation out of context, as well as any misquotation, could
be brought to the attention of the jury.
Other objections to direct admission of treatises are: (1) a particular
treatise may have been written on the basis of insufficient research,8 8 or (2)
it may be outmoded and fail to reflect current developments in the field,8 9
or (3) it may have been written for use in litigation.4 0 All of these latter
objections are easily answered. Before any book can be used for any pur-
pose in a trial the judge must make a preliminary finding that the book
is authoritative and in order to make an affirmative finding on this question
the judge must find that the book is free of any of these defects.
Given a rule that treatises may be introduced in evidence for the truth
of the statements contained in them only in conjunction with the testimony
of a "live" expert, there would seem to be no reason for the instant court,
having adopted the liberal rule with respect to the use of treatises on cross-
examination, to decline, when presented with the proper case, to adopt the
rule that treatises are admissible as direct evidence. There is, however,
34. See notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
35. Grubb, Proposed "Learned Treatises" Rule, 1946 Wis. L. Rev. 81, 87.
36. Note, 29 U. CINc. L. Rev. 255 (1960).
37. See Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 Wis. L. Rgv.
455, 460.
38. Grubb, supra note 35, at 87.
39. Gallagher v. Market St. R.R., 67 Cal. 16, 6 Pac. 869 (1885) ; 3 JoNes,
EVIDZNCI § 621, at 1183 (5th ed. 1958).
40. See Rowland, Cross-Examination of Medical Experts By The Use of
Treatises, 20 GA. B.J. 109, 110 (1957).
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a valid basis on which the court could refuse to expand the rule of the
present case, and that is that there is a greater need for treatises as a
tool for cross-examination than as direct evidence. An expert witness pur-
ports to be an authority. The best way to dispute the correctness of his
conclusions is to show that there are authoritative opinions expressing the
opposite or different views.4 1 This purpose is not adequately served by
calling to the stand an expert who expresses a different opinion. The testi-
mony of such an expert merely shows that a witness called by party A
testifies in favor of party A ; it does not necessarily discredit the testimony
of the other party's expert. Even more important is the fact that where
treatises are used on cross-examination the expert's testimony is discredited
immediately after it is given. On the other hand, if treatises were allowed
as direct evidence they would only buttress the testimony of a live expert.
They would not add another element to the plaintiff's case or the defense.
It is submitted that among all the possible rules with respect to the use
of treatises the one chosen by the court in the instant case is the best.
Raymond T. Letulle
FEDERAL COURTS - SENTENCE REVIEW - COURT OF APPEALS HAS
POWER UNDER SECTION 2106 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE TO MODIFY
DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED IN VIOLATION OF CORRECT SENTENCING
PROCEDURES.
Coleman v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1965)
Defendant, convicted of first degree murder for killing a police officer
while perpetrating a robbery, was sentenced to death under the mandatory
death provision' then existent in the District of Columbia. However, after
his conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 and while his
case was pending before the Supreme Court, Congress not only abolished
the District's mandatory death sentence,8 but also provided that in certain
cases death sentences imposed under the old law might be reduced to
life imprisonment.
4
41. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2404 (1961).
2. Coleman v. United States, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 813 (1962), rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 842 (1962).
3. D.C. CODr ANN. § 22-2404 (Supp. IV, 1965).
4. The interim statute provided that cases tried prior to March 22, 1962, which
were before the court for either sentencing or resentencing should be governed by the
prior law, except that the judge may, "in his sole discretion, consider circumstances
in mitigation and in aggravation and make a determination as to whether the case
in his opinion justifies a sentence of life imprisonment, in which event he shall sentence
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Defendant's motion for reduction of his sentence under the new act
was then rejected by the district court. However, the Court of Appeals
remanded the case, 5 instructing the lower court to hold a full evidentiary
hearing regarding all circumstances of aggravation and mitigation. The
district judge complied, but again confirmed the death sentence, holding
that defendant had not shown sufficient justification for its reduction. On
appeal, the Circuit Court reduced the sentence to life imprisonment, holding
that the lower court had erred in placing the burden of justifying mitigation
on the defendant, and that section 2106 of the Judicial Code6 gave the
appellate court power to modify the sentence to one "just under the cir-
cumstances." Coleman v. United States -.....F.2d ---- (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Prior to 1891, the Judicature Act of 18797 was construed by the circuit
courts to permit appellate review and modification of validly imposed
sentences.8 However, when the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts
was transferred to the circuit courts of appeals in that year,9 the language
relied on for this proposition was omitted; and, in Freeman v. United
States,10 the Ninth Circuit construed this omission so as to deprive the
appellate courts of the power of sentence review. Although it ignored both
a Supreme Court decision" holding that the powers conferred upon federal
appellate courts by previous legislation were incorporated in the 1891 act,
and a federal statute 12 providing that all provisions of review previously
regulating the circuit courts would now apply to the circuit court of
appeals, the conclusion in Freeman became the rule in the federal courts.
Thus, in 1930 the Eighth Circuit, in the case of Gurera v. United States,13
stated, "If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly
established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence
which is within the limits allowed by a statute."'1 4 Two years later, in
Blockburger v. United States,15 the Supreme Court, in upholding the
imposition of consecutive sentences on multiple counts of narcotic viola-
tions, adopted this position when it stated:
Under the circumstances, so far as disclosed, it is true that the imposi-
tion of the full penalty of fine and imprisonment upon each count seems
5. Coleman v. United States, 334 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
6. That section provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the
entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
7. Ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354 (1879). The act provided that "In case of an
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court, the Circuit Court shall proceed to
pronounce final sentence and to award execution thereon."
8. United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v. United
States, 10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Il1. 1881).
9. 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
10. 243 Fed. 353 (9th Cir. 1917).
11. Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895).
12. 26 Stat. 829 (1891).
13. 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930).
14. Id. at 340, 341.
15. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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unduly severe; but there may have been other facts and circumstances
before the trial court properly influencing the extent of punishment.
In any event, the matter was one for that court, with whose judgment
there is no warrant for interference on our part.16
The rule of non-review as enunciated by Gurera and Blockburger was
followed without question until the 1952 espionage case of United States
v. Rosenburg,'7 where for the first time section 2106 was asserted as
authority for appellate court review and modification of a validly imposed
sentence. The court, in affirming death sentences against the defendants,
refused to consider the statute as overruling sixty years of federal prece-
dents. Judge Frank, however, noted that although the statute dated back
to the Judiciary Act of 1789,18 and several states with similar statutes had
interpreted them to permit reduction of a validly imposed sentence,' 9 no
decision by either the Supreme Court or any federal court of appeals had
cited or considered the statute in passing upon the question. Were the
question res nova, he continued, the court should give section 2106 serious
consideration; but because of the long line of federal precedent to the
contrary, the Supreme Court alone was in a position to determine the effect
of that section on appellate review.
The Supreme Court, however, in the case of Gore v. United States,2
0
rejected Judge Frank's suggested interpretation,2' thus declining to "enter
the domain of penology, and more particularly that tantalizing aspect of it,
the proper apportionment of punishment. . . .First the English and then
the Scottish Courts of Criminal Appeal were given the power to revise
sentences, the power to increase as well as the power to reduce them....
This Court has no such power."
22
Thus, in spite of strong dissents from several judges,23 and against
the recommendation of almost all legal commentators who have considered
the subject,24 it is apparently well settled that federal appellate courts are
16. Id. at 305.
17. 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, rehearing denied, 344
U.S. 889 (1952).
18. The statute was originally included in the Act of September 24, 1789, Ch. 20,
§ 24, 1 Stat. 85. It later was included in the Act of June 1, 1872, Ch. 255, § 2, 17
Stat. 197, and was made applicable to the courts of appeals by the Act of March 3, 1891,
Ch. 517, § 11, 26 Stat. 829.
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1947) ; IDAHO CODM ANN. § 19-2821 (1948)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1958) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1930). See
Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507 161 At. 733 (1932).
20. 357 U.S. 386, rehearing denied, 35A U.S. 858 (1958).
21. On petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
denying the writ, stated:
One of the questions, however, first raised in the petition for rehearing, is
beyond the scope of the authority of this Court, and I deem it appropriate to
say so. A sentence imposed by a United States district court, even though it
be a death sentence, is not within the power of this Court to revise.
344 U.S. 889, 890 (1952).
22. 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
23. See Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 846; see also, Symposium - Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
24. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. Rxv. 671 (1962) ; Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should
There be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955) ; Hall, Reduction of Criminal
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without authority to review validly imposed sentences that are within
statutory limits.
There is, however, a well-defined exception to this rule in the area of
contempt, where no statutory limit exists to circumscribe the district
judge's discretion in imposing sentence.25 But this power of review and
modification derives from the duty of the appellate courts to supervise the
lower federal courts, and not section 2106. Thus, in Green v. United
States,26 which involved a prosecution for criminal contempt, the Supreme
Court, although affirming the sentences imposed by the trial court, noted
that since Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing
power for contempt, "appellate courts have a special responsibility for
determining that the power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by
revising themselves the sentence imposed."
27
Nor does the rule of non-review enunciated in Gurera preclude
appellate review of sentences imposed in a fundamentally unfair manner.
Such a situation was presented in Townsend v. Burke,28 where defendant,
who had pleaded guilty, was sentenced in the absence of counsel on the
basis of an erroneous assumption concerning his prior convictions. The
Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction, ruled that such a material
error in the sentencing rendered the proceedings lacking in due process.
A similar result has been reached where the district judge violated
sentencing procedures provided by statute. In United States v. Wiley, 29
the district judge, acting pursuant to his "standing policy," did not con-
sider defendant for probation because the latter had refused to plead guilty
and had insisted upon a trial. The court of appeals, in remanding the case
with instructions to consider defendant's motion for probation, ruled that
the trial judge had committed error by failing to conduct the pre-sentence
investigation required by the Federal Probation Act.
30
Further inroads upon the Gurera doctrine were made by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court in two recent decisions which extended Wiley
to include situations where the trial court merely declined to utilize pre-
sentencing procedures made available by Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In the first of these cases, Peters v. United States,3 l
the district judge imposed the maximum sentence upon two adolescents
convicted of robbery. In a per curiam opinion, the Circuit Court vacated
25. See Note, 74 YALn L.J. 379 (1964).
26. 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
27. Id. at 188. In Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958), defendant was
convicted on eleven counts of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions
concerning the Communist Party membership of others, The Supreme Court re-
manded for resentencing, but the district court reimposed the same sentence. In setting
aside the sentence, the Supreme Court relied upon its supervisory power over the
administration of justice in the lower courts.
28. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
29. 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959). The case is noted'in 10 Dg PAUL L. Rev. 104
(1960), and 75 HARV. L. Rrv. 416 (1961).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
31. 307 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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the sentence under section 2106, ruling that the lower court's failure to
conduct the authorized presentence investigation constituted error.
In the second case, Leach v. United States,3 2 the trial judge refused to
grant defendant's request for a psychiatric examination, although three
alternate statutory procedures for determining mental competence were
available. The Circuit Court again set aside the sentence, and remanded
with directions to conduct the appropriate examination. The basis for this
decision, however, was that the trial judge had abused his discretion.
Although the statutes imposed no affirmative duty, the court reasoned that
"the sentencing Judge should use some of the resources which Congress has
provided and . ..may not arbitrarily ignore the data properly obtained
thereby."
3 3
Wiley, Peters and Leach illustrate and support the position of the
instant court that appellate courts have the authority to review a sentence
when the district judge has ignored or violated sentencing procedures
provided by statute. Although the convictions were affirmed, and the sen-
tences imposed were within the bounds of the applicable statute, in each
case the court held that the trial court had followed an incorrect procedure
in imposing sentence, and consequently the sentence itself could be re-
viewed. However, in each case the court founded its power to act upon
different grounds. Therefore, although these cases indicate an increasing
willingness on the part of the appellate courts to protect a defendant from
procedural error or abuse of discretion in imposing sentence, they fail to
establish a definitive basis for such review. Nor did the court in any of these
cases undertake to substitute its own sentence for that of the trial court.
The court in the instant case has clearly indicated that it considers
section 2106 as the most appropriate basis for this authority. In addition,
it construed that section to authorize reduction of the death sentence under
consideration to life imprisonment. Precedent for this result was found in
the court's earlier decision in Frady v. United States.34 There defendants
were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. However,
the court of appeals found that the sentences were invalidly imposed due
to an erroneous instruction to the jury and the inadequacy of the required
jury poll. Because of these errors, the court, although confirming the con-
viction, refused to permit the death sentences to stand. Since the only
alternative authorized by statute was life imprisonment, the court, acting
under section 2106, modified the sentence to life imprisonment.
In Frady, however, only three judges expressly based the court's
power to modify the sentence upon section 2106. Of the two remaining
judges necessary to constitute a majority, one dissented from the affirm-
ance of the first degree murder conviction, while the other contended that
a two-step procedure should have been utilized in imposing the sentence.
Thus, since neither of these two judges expressed an opinion as to the
32. 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
33. Id. at 951.
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scope of review authorized by section 2106, the propriety of invoking that
provision remained subject to some doubt.
In resolving this question, the present court emphasized the impossi-
bility of reconstructing the proper sentencing procedure in the lower court;
yet since the conviction had been affirmed, the court deemed it improper
to order a new trial. And since the only alternative to the death sentence
was life imprisonment, the court concluded it was authorized to make final
disposition of the case.
Procedural review of sentences is to be encouraged in so far as it
protects the rights of defendants without destroying that element of dis-
cretion as to punishment necessarily residing in the trial judge. So long
as the trial judge follows correct procedure in determining sentence, its
determination as to the proper punishment should not be disturbed.
The present case in no way impugns that principle. Coleman only
holds that when it is impossible to correct the error on remand will the
appellate court undertake to modify the sentence. It is submitted that
section 2106 was correctly interpreted by the court; there is no reason
to hold that the statute does not authorize that which it explicitly provides.
Given the growing tendency on the part of the federal appellate courts to
review and modify improperly imposed sentences, section 2106 would
clearly seem to provide the most appropriate basis.
Joseph F. Ricchiuti
FEDERAL COURTS - THREE-JUDGE COURTS - CASE ARISING UNDER
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND INVOLVING ONLY FEDERAL-STATE
STATUTORY CONFLICT IS NOT WITHIN PURVIEW OF SECTION 2281
OF THREE-JUDGE COURT ACT.
Swift & Co. v. Wickham (U.S. 1965)
Appellants were packers and shippers of frozen stuffed turkeys which
they sold, on a national scale, to retailers. In conformity with the Poultry
Products Inspection Act of 1957,1 a federal statute, the turkeys were labeled
to indicate their net weight, including the stuffing. Some of the turkeys
were sold in New York which had its own statute2 governing the sale of
poultry products. This statute had been interpreted to require such food
products to be labeled to indicate the net weight of the bird, both stuffed
and unstuffed. Appellants requested permission of the appropriate federal
agency to change their labels to conform to New York law, but their request
was denied. Appellants then sought to enjoin enforcement of the New
1. 71 Stat. 441, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-69 (1964); 7 C.F.R. §§ 81.125, 81.130 (1959).
2. N.Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKET LAW § 193(3).
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York law, asserting that such enforcement would conflict with and over-
ride the requirements of the federal statute." As provided by section 2281
of the Judicial Code, a three-judge court was convened. Acting in both a
three-judge and a single-judge capacity, this court dismissed the suit on
the merits. Pursuant to section 1253 of the Judicial Code an appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;
holding that an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a state statute
on the basis of violation of the supremacy clause of the federal constitu-
tion does not require the convening of a three-judge court. Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
Whenever a party seeks to enjoin, either temporarily or permanently,
a state official from enforcing a state statute on the ground that such statute
is unconstitutional, the relief sought can only be granted by a three-judge
court.4 The same requirement is imposed upon those litigants seeking to
enjoin enforcement of an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds.5 This
procedural device, Which is neither a right nor a privilege," is the final
product of Congressional concern over federal interference with state legis-
lative regulation.
7
Historically, the lower federal judiciary had no power to review state
court determinations," but in 1875 Congress granted them jurisdiction
over all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States.9 This grant of power was not attacked in earnest, however, until
3. The district court rejected as insubstantial the claims of unconstitutionality
based on the commerce clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
men t. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). However,
the Supreme Court has recently held that a supremacy clause claim coupled with
other claims of unconstitutionality not insubstantial on their face requires the con-
vening of a three-judge court, and that direct appeal to the Court is proper, even
where the pre-emption issue only is decided in the district court and the other
challenges to constitutionality are not passed upon. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs
v. Chicago, R.I.&P. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) :
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, opera-
tion or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the uncon-
stitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964) provides that the 2281 court will be composed as follows:
(1) The district judge to whom the application for injunction or other relief
is presented shall constitute one member of such court. On the filing of the
application, he shall immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall
designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge. Such
judges shall serve as members of the court to hear and determine the action or
proceeding.
5. 28 U.S.C, § 2282 (1964)
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, opera-
tion or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of
the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title.
6. Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 553, 555 (10th Cir. 1938).
7. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
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after the 1907 Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Young.'0 The power
of a single federal judge to prevent state enforcement of its own statutes
was bitterly criticized, and sometimes with ample justification." As a
result of the federal abuses in granting injunctions, Congress, in 1910,
passed the Mann-Elkins Act12 which, while guaranteeing federal protec-
tion of constitutional rights, also provided for due deliberation and recog-
nition of the seriousness of the issues involved before a state statute would
be pronounced unconstitutional and its enforcement restrained. In 1925 the
act was amended to include applications for permanent as well as interlocu-
tory decrees 13 and in the Judiciary Act of 1937 the three-judge require-
ment was extended to cases where an Act of Congress was challenged
as unconstitutional.
14
The courts have had some problem in deciding what was meant by
"state statute"'15 and "state official,"'1 6 but the question of what constitutes
a "substantial claim of unconstitutionality" is the one which has presented
the most difficulty. 17 In re Buder18 held that the necessity of contruing an
Act of Congress to determine the validity of a Missouri taxing statute did
not amount to a substantial claim of unconstitutionality and therefore
section 266 did not apply. This principle was affirmed in Ex Parte
10. 209 U.S. 123 (1907). In this case the Court affirmed the power of the district
judge to enjoin the attorney general of Minnesota from instituting criminal proceed-
ings in order to enforce compliance with a state law regulating railroad rates within
Minnesota which was alleged to be unconstitutional.
11. See 42 CoNG. Rgc. 4853 (1908) (Remarks of Senator Bacon of Georgia)
45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910) (Remarks of Senator Overman of North Carolina)
49 CON. REc. 4773 (1913) (Remarks of Mr. Clayton of Alabama quoting Governor
Byrnes of South Dakota) ; see also Hutcheson, A Case For Three Judges, 47 HARV.
L. Rev. 795 (1934).
12. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557, which later became Act of
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162.
13. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128, 43 Stat. 936.
14. Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 752.
15. See AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946). "In our view the word 'statute'...
is a compendious summary of various enactments by whatever method they may be
adopted, to which a State gives her sanction and is at least sufficiently inclusive to
embrace constitutional provisions." Id. at 592-93. See also Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S.
565 (1928) ; Oliver v. Mayor and Councilmen, 346 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Note,
Three-Judge Court - "Meaning of State Statute," 30 N.C.L. Rgv. 423 (1952).
16. See City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945); Bianchi v.
Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 538
(1963), which concludes that the determination of who is a state officer "turns on
the interest being served rather than the title of the individual concerned." Id. at 551.
17. The possibility of excepting certain cases which could come within the purview
of § 2281 occurred to the courts soon after the passage of § 266 (now 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281). E.g.,
That there is a conflict between state and federal law does not always bring to
mind the issue of unconstitutionality of the former; yet it is prescribed by the
federal Constitution that it and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof
shall be the supreme law of the land, and it seems to follow that a state statute
which is in conflict with a federal statute, when the latter is pursuant to and
within the power given by the federal Constitution, is, in a very real sense
unconstitutional.
Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, 271 Fed. 319, 321 (E.D. Mich.
1921). But see note 19 infra.
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Bransford,19 a case which involved a state tax on national banks. The Court
admitted that by virtue of the supremacy clause the federal statutes would
be superior to those of the state but that this determination in the case
at bar involved construction of the federal act and not the constitutionality
of the state enactment and that therefore a three-judge court was not
required.2 0 The strong reaffirmance of this "supremacy clause exception" in
Case v. Bowles21 and the Court's oft-quoted statement that the three-judge
requirement was not to be "viewed as a measure of broad social policy to
be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the
strict sense of the term and to be applied as such .. .*22 was more than
amply indicative to the lower federal judicial that a petition alleging con-
flict between a state and federal statute need not be heard before a three-
judge court.23 However once it had been established that it was necessary
to convene a three-judge court, the joining in the complaint of a non-con-
stitutional attack on the statute along with the constitutional one did not
dispense with the necessity of three judges. 24 The Court has also made
manifest its concern with the unnecessary convening of a three-judge court
by expressly holding that the requirement does not exist where the statute
challenged is obviously unconstitutional.2
Thus the decision in Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety,26 striking down
the supremacy clause exception and widening the scope of the application
of section 2281, seemed inconsistent with prior decisions and was much
criticized.27 In Kesler the Court stated that "neither the language of section
2281 nor the purpose which gave rise to it affords the remotest reason
for carving out an unfrivolous claim of unconstitutionality because of the
Supremacy Clause from the comprehensive language of section 2281."
28
The Court however, refused to overrule the prior cases and substituted for
the "supremacy clause exception" the requirement that a three-judge court
be convened if the "case presents a sole, immediate constitutional ques-
tion .... -29 This statement was followed by a seventeen page analysis of
the relevant state and federal statutes which culminated in a dismissal
19. 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
20. Id. at 359.
21. 327 U.S. 92 (1946). A three-judge court was held not required where "the
complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the State statute but alleged merely
that its enforcement would violate the Emergency Price Control Act." Id. at 97.
22. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1941).
23. But see Bradley v. Waterfront Comm'n, 130 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
where it was stated, "However, if the Supremacy claim is substantial enough to
support federal jurisdiction in the first instance, it might be argued that the other
constitutional claim, though insubstantial, would have to be heard before a Three-
Judge Court since a single District Judge can only dismiss for want of jurisdiction."
Id. at 311.
24. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
25. "We hold that three judges are similarly not required when, as here, prior
decisions make frivolous any claim that a state statute on its face is not unconstitu-
tional." Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
26. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
27. E.g., 15 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1963) ; 111 PA. L. REv. 113 (1963) ; 77 HARV. L.
Riv. 299 (1962).
28. 369 U.S. at 156.
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of the appeal on the merits. As was pointed out by the dissent in that case,
all supremacy clause cases involve some preliminary construction, and the
fact that seventeen pages of construction were required to establish a sole
immediate question of constitutionality can only add to the confusion in
which the lower courts have already become enmeshed in determining
when to convene a three-judge court.3 0 After only a three year trial period,
Kesler has now been overruled by Swift and a complete revival of the
"supremacy clause exception" has been effected. 31
When Congress enacted what is now section 2281, the legislative
intent was "to provide a more responsible forum for the litigation of suits
which, if successful, would render void state statutes embodying important
state policies." 32 This Congressional desire to protect state legislation from
injunctive frustration by the federal judicial has been recognized by the
Court before, 83 but while cognizant of this purpose the Court remained
steadfast in its determination that supremacy clause cases were not within
the purview of this legislation.3 4 Although Congress has never indicated
its disapproval of the Court-made "supremacy clause exception," in light
of the above mentioned legislative intent, it cannot be inferred that Con-
gressional silence on this point is indicative of its approval. This judicial
desire to construe Congressional silence as approval is indulging in a
fiction which the Court recognized in Kesler and unsuccessfully tried to
avoid by adopting the "sole, immediate question" test.8 5 In the instant case
the Court indicated that the supremacy clause exception is without sub-
stantial foundation except in the Court's own decisions but felt persuaded
by "policy considerations" to continue it in effect until Congress voices its
disapproval. 36 The merits of the perpetuation of this "fictional" approach
to applying section 2281 would seem to be analogous to the reasoning
associated with the argument for total abrogation of the three-judge
requirement.37 While the Court is powerless to void an Act of Congress
except on constitutional grounds,38 it is submitted that the supremacy
clause exception contravenes the intent of Congress and, in effect, renders
section 2281 partially inoperative. Nevertheless, the instant case did supply
the clarification needed to alleviate the confusion which Kesler imposed
upon the district judge in trying to make his threshold determination of
proper jurisdiction.
30. Id. at 176-80.
31. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
32. Id. at 119.
33. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941). "The crux of the business is
procedural protection against an improvident state-wide doom by a federal court of a
state's legislative policy. This was the aim of Congress and this is the reconciling
principle of the cases." Id. at 251.
34. Id. at 250-51.
35. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
36. 382 U.S. at 111, 126.
37. See Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation:
A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHi. L. REv. 555 (1960). But see Comment, 61
MicH. L. Rxv. 1528 (1963) ; Note, 49 VA. L. Rgv. 538 (1963).
38. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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That the threshold determination of whether to convene a section 2281
court is of the utmost importance and is in need of clear and stable
standards is amply demonstrated by the problems inherent in obtaining
appellate review of a case heard by the wrong tribunal. When a litigant
petitions a federal district court for injunctive relief from the enforcement
of a state statute alleged to be unconstitutional, the court, as in all cases,
must first determine the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction.3 9
The Court must then make the further determination whether the com-
plaint contains a substantial claim of unconstitutionality sufficient to satisfy
the requirements for the convening of a three-judge court.40 If a three-
judge court is mistakenly convened its decision is nevertheless valid, but
review can only be had in the circuit court of appeals. 41 As this jurisdic-
tional defect may be raised at any time during the litigation, the safe course
would appear to be to lodge a timely appeal in the circuit court concurrently
with the section 125342 direct appeal to the Supreme Court and thus avoid
a statute of limitations problem. 43 However, if a district judge mistakenly
fails to convene a three-judge court and hears the case on the merits his
decree is void for lack of jurisdiction and no review of his determination
on the merits may be had. In the past, the only procedure available in this
situation was mandamus to the Supreme Court ;44 lately however, it has
been indicated that an appeal may lie to the circuit court.45 Both situations
illustrate the pitfalls that may trap those not skilled in federal procedure
and the importance of a correct threshold determination of jurisdiction by
the district judge. A mistake, while not usually fatal to the case, can prove
to be costly and time-consuming both to the judiciary and the litigants.
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in the instant case, stated
that the above reasons are the principal motivation behind the overruling
of Kesler.46 Justification for this disregard of stare decisis is stated to be
39. Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) ; Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th
Cir. 1957).
40. "It is . . . the duty of a district judge, to whom an application for an injunc-
tion restraining the enforcement of a state statute or order is made, to scrutinize the
bill of complaint to ascertain whether a substantial federal question is presented .. "
California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 254 (1938) ; accord,
Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1965) ; McReynolds v. Christen-
berry, 233 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
41. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248 (1941).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964): "Except as otherwise provided by law, any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges."
43. FID. R. Civ. P. 73(a), allows thirty days for perfecting an appeal from a
district court decree. Where the three-judge court's lack of jurisdiction is not dis-
covered until the case is before the Supreme Court the thirty days have usually elapsed
with the result that the right to appeal is lost. However, the Court has recently held
that in such a situation the parties should not be deprived of appellate review on the
merits and has vacated the decree below and remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken. Pennsyl-
vania Pub. Util. Comm'r v. Pennsylvania R.R., 382 U.S. 281 (1965).
44. Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 16 (1930).
45. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715-16 (1962).
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based on a permissible reading of section 2281 and a long standing interest
of the Supreme Court in not unduly burdening the federal courts and keep-
ing within narrow confines its own scope of mandatory appellate review.
47
The instant case has alleviated the confusion which Kesler created and
clarified the "supremacy clause exception"; and insofar as this provides
clear guidelines for the district courts in the correct application of section
2281 the decision is well received. But it is submitted that it is questionable
whether the Court was justified in creating the "supremacy clause excep-
tion" at all, and it is regretted that the Court, while according ample
recognition to this issue, reinstated a doctrine of long standing which has
partially defeated the purpose of this Act of Congress.
Richard G. Greiner
LABOR LAW - PROTECTED ACTIVITIES - SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT PROHIBITS DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEES FOR
ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE THEIR EMPLOYER TO HIRE NEGROES.
NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. (9th Cir. 1965)
Respondent taxi cab company employed at its Santa Monica branch
between 50 and 60 drivers, none of whom were Negroes. It did, however,
employ Negroes in three other communities where it rendered service. Two
employees of the company, who were active in local civil rights groups,
went to the respondent's manager to persuade him to hire a Negro driver.
Shortly thereafter one of these employees was discharged, purportedly
because of involvement in two accidents in two successive days. This
employee then began to picket the company in protest of its hiring practices.
The second employee was discharged for conduct against the interests of
the company after he picketed with the first employee on his off-duty hours.
This second employee, however, was subsequently rehired. The trial
examiner found that the employees were engaged in "concerted activities"
as that term is used in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,'
and that they were discharged for that reason, but was of the opinion that
Congress did not intend section 7 to be applicable in this context. 2 The
47. Id. at 266-68.
1. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964)
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section [8(a) (3)].
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National Labor Relations Board found to the contrary on this latter point
and entered an order of reinstatement which it sought to have enforced
by the instant proceeding.3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the Board and held that concerted activities engaged to persuade an
employer to hire Negroes are protected by section 7. NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965) .4
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees to all
employees "the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 5 The
respondent in the instant case was charged with violating section 8(a) (1)
of the same act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed" them in the preceeding section.6
In upholding the employees' contention that their section 7 rights had
been violated, the court found that they had engaged in "concerted activity"
for the purpose of affecting the "terms and conditions of their employment."
The term "concerted activity," as construed by the courts, is used to in-
dicate not merely a literal physical relationship of concert of action between
two or more employees, but to describe a "legal status" of the activity in
question, which status is determined by looking not only to the other
modifying words of the statute, such as "mutual aid or protection," but
also by considering several extrinsic factors, such as the nature and pur-
pose of the activity. 7 Certainly not every type of concerted activity is
protected by the act, and the Supreme Court has indicated that activity
of a violent nature, 8 for an unlawful purpose,9 or in breach of a contract' °
cannot be condoned under the act regardless of any question of concert.
For this reason, it has been suggested, and is in fact often the practice
of the courts, to talk in terms of "protected activity" rather than to use the
literal terminology of the statute."
In determining what activity is protected under the act it is necessary
to keep in mind the language of section 1 which declares the policy of
Congress to be one including the encouragement of "the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" and the protection of "the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
3. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964).
4. However, since there existed an established bargaining representative through
whom the employees might have acted the court remanded the case for further con-
clusions of law and findings of fact as to whether this would limit the extent of
protection under section 7.
5. See note 1, supra.
6. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1964).
7. Note, Concerted Activity Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129.
8. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
9. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
10. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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protection.' 2 Taken together sections 1 and 7 indicate that to be pro-
tected an activity must also concern a "term and condition of employment."1 3
In a recent case, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,' 4 several em-
ployees walked out of a plant because the furnace had broken down and
the employees felt it was too cold to work. Since the activity for which
the men were discharged was one protesting an actual physical condition
of the premises on which they worked, the Court had no trouble finding
the activities to be within the purview of the statute. In so concluding
the Court warned against interpreting the broad language of the statute
in a "restricted fashion" so as to defeat the purposes of the Act. The
Court found further that "the activities engaged in here do not fall within
the normal categories of unprotected concerted activities such as those that
are unlawful, violent, or in breach of contract."'15 Examined by itself, the
very broad language used in this case would seem to call for the decision
reached in the instant case.
However, beginning with the anti-injunction area there is a line of
cases which tend to impose a further limitation on the sphere of protection.
One such case is Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co.16
Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides that no injunction shall issue "in
any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and
employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons
seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to property . "... 1 The court in Vonnegut held that the phrase
"terms and conditions of employment" as used in this section contemplated
"such things as hours of labor, wages, classifications of employees, sanitary
and physical conditions controllable by the employer,"' 8 and that therefore
the section could not be used to defeat an injunction against workers on
strike merely because the employer had certain contracts 19 on which the
employees did not wish to work. To invoke it in such a case would amount
to telling the employer how to "conduct his business." The same rationale
12. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151 (1964).
13. Under sections 8(a) (5), 8(d) and 9(a) of the National Labor RelationsAct it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to fail to bargain with laborrepresentatives "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions ofemployment." A question of the scope of legitimate employee interest also arises inthis area, but because the language used in section 9(a) is somewhat more restrictivethan that of section 7 the standard under the former section may be narrower than the
one involved in the instant case. For the definitive discussion of the scope of employeeinterest under section 9(a), see Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964).
14. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
15. Id. at 17.
16. 263 Fed. 192 (N.D. Ohio 1920).
17. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
18. Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192, 201 (N.D.
Ohio 1920). See also A. J. Monday Co. v. Automobile Workers, 171 Wis. 532, 177
N.W. 867 (1920).
19. The contracts were made with a company which was having labor difficulties
but which, however, had not been struck.
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has been employed where Section 7 of the NLRA was involved. In NLRB
v. Reynold's Intl Pen Co.20 employees who had staged a walkout on the
company's ball point pen factory in protest against the demotion of a
foreman were discharged. The court held that they could not claim pro-
tection under Section 7 of the NLRA since the demoting of a foreman
was a "prerogative of management."' 21 On the other hand, in the case
of NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,22 also involving Section 7
of the NLRA, the salesmen of respondent's insurance company had very
close and continuous dealings2 3 with the office cashier. When he resigned,
they were all desirous that a particular assistant cashier would fill his
position and signed a petition to this effect, but were discharged before
they could deliver it. A majority of the court was of the opinion that the
concerted activities were protected, as the appointment of a cashier in this
instance "bore a reasonable relation to terms and conditions of their
employment, '24 and ordered reinstatement of the employees. A vigorous
dissenting opinion found the activities to be concerned with matters "wholly
within the managerial orbit" and as far as the employees were concerend
"none of their business. '25 These cases bespeak an attempt to define a
sphere of legitimate labor interest, that is, to draw a line between those
matters on which labor should be free to voice an opinion and those which
are exclusively the concern of management.
Considering the nature of concerted activity in the Phoenix case and
the apparent inconsistency of this decision with Reynolds Pen, it would
seem that a court is more likely to hold protected employee activity which
amounts to no more than suggestions or advice than activity which halts
production or interferes substantially with the conduct of the business. In
point of fact, three general areas of employee interest may be discerned.
First, there are those things about which an employer must bargain with
his men or be guilty of an unfair labor practice.26 Second, there are those
matters over which management retains complete authority so that mere
suggestions by an employee can be treated as insubordination.2 7 Third,
there are those matters, as in the Phoenix case, which are within the
prerogative of management to the extent that the employer is not required
to bargain over them, yet which are of sufficient interest to the employees
20. 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947). Contra, Container Mfg. Co. v. AFL, 75 N.L.R.B.
1082 (1948).
21. Id. at 684.
22. 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
23. The court found that "the degree of efficiency of the cashier and employees
in that department often aids or hinders the effectiveness of the work of the insurance
salesmen. Inconvenience, embarrassment, added work and loss of sales to prospective
customers have, in the past, resulted to salesmen from such incidents as errors which
a cashier made in calculating costs .. " Id. at 987.
24. Id. at 988.
25. Ibid. Cf. Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1949);
Fontaine Converting Works, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1948).
26. See note 13 supra.
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that while they cannot coerce their employer, by strike or otherwise, in
making decisions upon them, they cannot be discharged for mere sugges-
tions as to them, since they are "reasonably related to" their employment.
28
The apparent inconsistency between the Reynolds Pen and Phoenix
decisions might also be explained by the fact that in the latter case the
employees had an economic interest in the functioning of the cashier, while
in the former such interest was absent. Indeed, the fact situations in all
of the decisions upholding activity as protected under section 7 have in-
dicated the existence of some economic, health, or safety interest in the
complaining employees.2 9 From this it might very well be argued that
since the employees in the instant case had no such interest, but merely
desired to work in a racially integrated atmosphere, their activities should
not have been held protected. However, there are four possible objections
to this line of reasoning. First, the language of the statute is broad enough
to cover all concerted activity regardless of the kind of employee interest
involved. Second, while it is true that in all the former decisions the fact
situations indicated that such interests were present, the language of the
cases, especially such later cases Washington Aluminum, did not suggest
such a limitation, but rather seemed to point the other way. Moreover,
it now seems clear that employee activity is initially considered protected,
with an exception being made only when the conduct of the employees
"plainly deserves condemnation."30 It would be very difficult for a court
to find the activities of the employees in the instant case deserving of con-
demnation. Third, the distinction cited seems not to have been followed
in later cases. In NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc.,31 for
example, the employees seeking reinstatement were discharged for com-
plaining about the appointment of a new foreman to replace one who had
become ill. The men believed that one of the present crew members should
have been elevated to the supervisory position. The court found the activity
of the men protected even though their only interest was in making their
work "easier." Fourth, granting that some economic or safety interest is
a prerequisite of legitimate activity on the part of employees, it could
possibly be found in the present case by reference to closely analogous
areas of labor law. As early as 1942 Judge Learned Hand, in NLRB v.
Peter Callier Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc., 32 held protected em-
ployee activity in protest against the company's antagonism of an outside
union on the theory that at some future time the outside union might
28. Accord, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8
(6th Cir. 1960); International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 299 F.2d
114 (D.C. Cir. 1962), ibid. sub. norn., Walls Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
29. See, e.g., Metal Blast, Inc. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1963) (seniority
rights in layoffs) ; Walls Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 28 (sanitary conditions).
30. Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 325
(1951).
31. 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
32. 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
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return the favor.8 3 The same rationale is used to uphold sympathy strikes3 4
and other activities undertaken where the interests of the employees might
be said to be indirect.
Any question whether racial discrimination should be considered
legitimate grounds for concerted activity would seem to have been answered
in the case of New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.3 5 The Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which prohibits the issuance of injunctions in certain types
of labor disputes,36 provides that the term "labor dispute" shall include
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment. '37 In this
case picketing by a group of Negroes, none of whom were employees, for
the purpose of persuading the owner of a grocery store to hire Negro
clerks, was held by the Supreme Court to be a protected activity under
that act. The opinion stated in part,
race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more
unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the
ground of union affiliation. There is no justification in the apparent
purposes or the express terms of the act for limiting its definition of
labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those which
arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment .... 38
The court in Tanner relied heavily on the language of this case, finding it
"equally applicable" to the present situation.
The trial examiner, who found for the respondent, was of the opinion
that since Congress had established during World War II a Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission to deal with racial discrimination in govern-
ment contracts, while in essence the same section 7 was in effect, showed
a legislative belief that such matters were not covered by the NLRA.3 9
He further found that to allow relief here would present problems in a
strike "by employees to compel an employer to hire or discharge Catholics
or Protestants, as the case may be, so as to have a working force which
would reflect the religious composition of their neighborhood," or similarly
if "avowed atheists" would demand remedial action.
40
The arguments of the trial examiner have a familiar ring and are in-
variably heard whenever a racial question of any kind is before the court,
and they are usually received with a relatively deaf ear. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act find an identity
33. Compare Modern Motors Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944).
34. Texas Foundaries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
35. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
36. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
37. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
38. 303 U.S. at 561.
39. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1964) (decision of trial
examiner).
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in their purpose to grant labor an opportunity to bargain fairly with
employers without fear of reprisal in the form of job loss or the issuance
of injunctions. 41 The New Negro case is therefore sufficiently analogous
to the present situation, that, taken together with the strong public policy
involved in the area of race relations, it can be said to show Supreme
Court recognition of a Congressional intent to have the National Labor
Relations Act encompass, as far as its language will allow, equality in
hiring practices. The Phoenix case demonstrated that even in the sacrosanct
area of management's prerogative to hire and fire supervisory personnel
at its discretion, labor has a legitimate interest, at least sufficient to permit
moderate concerted activities. In the instant case, the court seems to
have applied the same reasoning with respect to would-be employees, and,
it is submitted, rightly so in view of the great inequities that result from
racial discrimination in hiring, the strong public sentiment in this area,
and the limited nature of the activities of the employees.
The management camp would seem to have little cause for alarm
over the instant holding, for three days after the Tanner decision came
down the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted into law. 42 This act not
only makes racially discriminatory hiring practices unlawful, but also
creates an Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to investigate com-
plaints of unfair employment practices.4 3 Thus is provided, for those em-
ployees and others who wish to secure equal job opportunities for all an ex-
pedient and effective method of so doing without fear of employer reprisals.
Race discrimination in hiring has long been recognized by responsible
labor and management officials as a proper subject for collective bar-
gaining.44 It is submitted that in recognizing that the racial integration
of the plant is a proper objective of concerted activities by employees the
instant court has espoused a justifiable and enlightened reading of the
National Labor Relations Act.
William E. Chillas
41. Prior to 1932, the law of labor relations was limited to the few judicial
precedents available at the common law and these were very limited in scope. Conse-
quently, injunctions against striking workers were very freely granted. Recognizing
the workers need to bargain effectively with emoloyers, Congress adopted a series of
anti-injunction statutes which culminated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.
More affirmative legislation was to follow later with the passage of the National Labor
Relations Act (Wagner Act), the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
Hartley Act), and others. These later statutes primarily enacted into positive law
those rights of employees which had been recognized many years earlier.
42. 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
43. It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . ..
78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) (a) (1964).
44. Many major collective bargaining agreements now contain provisions against
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TORTS - PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - INSURER WHICH INDUCES
DOCTOR TO DIVULGE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION GAINED THROUGH
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP IS LIABLE IN DAMAGES TO PATIENT.
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (N.D. Ohio 1965)
Plaintiff was injured when the hospital bed in which he was lying
collapsed. When plaintiff instituted suit against the hospital, defendant,
the hospital's malpractice insurer, contacted plaintiff's physician, whom it
also insured, for the purpose of securing confidential information on the
nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries. To induce the physician to dis-
close this information, defendant falsely represented to him that plaintiff
was considering a similar action against him. Upon discovery of the facts
the plaintiffs instituted a separate action against the insurer for this in-
ducement. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim.1 On reconsideration of this order, the court held that one
who induces a doctor to divulge confidential information in violation of
such doctor's legal responsibility to his patient, may also be held liable in
damages to the patient. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
As the reasoning of the court in the instant case indicates, no action
lies for inducement of a physician's disclosure of confidential information
unless that disclosure is itself an actionable wrong on the part of the
physician. The issue of whether a physician is liable for making such a
disclosure is by no means a new one, but it has nonetheless been scarcely
litigated.2 The first known case on the issue of unauthorized divulgence
was A.B. v. C.D.,3 a Scottish case in which plaintiff hired defendant doctor
to examine his child, born six months after his marriage, and to give him
a confidential report as to whether the child had been born prematurely.
Upon deciding that the child was not premature, the doctor delivered a
copy of his report to the minister of plaintiff's church, with the result that
plaintiff was expelled from the congregation. On the issue of whether
the employment of the doctor imposed upon him on obligation of secrecy
the court said,
that a medical man, consulted in a matter of delicacy, of which the
disclosure may be most injurious to the feelings, and possibly, the
pecuniary interests of the party consulting, can gratuitously and un-
necessarily make it the subject of public communication, without in-
curring any imputation beyond what is called a breach of honour, and
without the liability to a claim of redress in a court of law, is a proposi-
tion to which, when thus broadly laid down, I think the Court will
hardly give their countenance.
4
1. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
2. "Bearing in mind the medical profession's traditional aversion to breach of
confidence, it is not surprising that the development of legal prohibitions against dis-
closure has been limited." Note, 52 COLUm. L. R~v. 383, 385 (1952).
3. 14 Sess. Cas. 2d 177 (Scot. 1st Div. 1851).
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Forty-five years later, a British court held a doctor liable in an action for
"breach of doctor-patient confidence" when the physician, disclosed a mis-
carriage terminating a pregnancy which was the product of an adulter-
ous affair.5
It was not until 19206 that an American court of last resort was called
upon to determine a physician's liability for voluntarily revealing out of
court7 a patient's confidence. In Simonsen v. Swenson8 the court held
that a state licensing statute prohibiting "betrayal of a professional secret
to the detriment of a patient"9 imposed a duty of trust and confidence upon
the physician, the breach of which "would give rise to a civil action for
the damages naturally flowing from such wrong."' 0 A 1960 New York
case, Clark v. Geraci,n cited the Simonsen case for the proposition that an
action for divulging confidential communication should lie. The court held
that the duty of secrecy implied in the state privileged communication
statute12 should extend to out of court utterances by physicians. Both
licensing statutes and privileged communications statutes usually prescribe
a standard of conduct for physicians. The former prohibit unauthorized
out-of-court disclosures, while the latter forbid physicians to make un-
authorized disclosures on the witness stand. Neither, however, provides
for recovery by patients whose confidences have been disclosed in violation
of the statute.
In Hague v. Williams13 the New Jersey Supreme Court found the
absence of a statute a conclusive bar to a patient's recovery for unauthorized
divulgence. In that case the parents of an infant brought an action against
a doctor for disclosing to an insurer to whom the parents had applied for
life insurance on the infant that the child had had heart trouble since birth.
The court distinguished Simonsen and Clark on the presence in those
cases of statutes which served as indicia of the existence of "an established
public policy recognizing a confidential relationship.' 4 It may be argued,
however, that recovery should be granted in the absence of a statute en-
joining a duty of secrecy upon physicians. Indeed, it may be argued that
a court with its hand on the pulse of popular feeling and recognizing the
5. For the only known report of this case, see the discussion of Hitson v. Playfair,
1 BRIT. M4D. J. 815, 882 (1896).
6. An earlier case, decided on an issue of pleading, had dicta declaring, "Neither
is it necessary to pursue at length the inquiry of whether a cause of action lies in
favor of a patient against a physician for wrongfully divulging confidential communi-
cations. For the purposes of what we shall say it will be assumed that, for so palpable
a wrong, the law provides a remedy." Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 Pac. 572,
572-73 (1917).
7. The instant case and this note deal only with diclosure made out of court.
For a discussion of the separate action for courtroom disclosures see Annot., 73
A.L.R.2d 325 (1960).
8. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-148 (1943).
10. 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
11. 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
12. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4504 (1963).
13. 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
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needs of society has the discretion to label something contrary to public
policy. And a course of conduct is against public policy when it is repug-
nant to the reasonable man's conception of justice. Moreover, it has been
held that anything which tends to debase the learned professions is at
war with the public interest and is therefore contrary to public policy.15
In the instant case, the federal district court sitting in Ohio had before
it both a privileged communications statute'6 and a medical licensing
statute17 which proscribed private disclosure of the confidential statements
of patients. The court found that together with the American Medical
Association's Code of Professional Ethics18 these statutes declared the
public policy of Ohio to be against unauthorized disclosure. The instant
case stands unique among the cases in this area, however, in that the
court expressly' 9 rested its decision on public policy. "Modern public
policy, not the archaic whims of the common law, demands that doctors
obey their implied promise of secrecy." 20
The court did, however, discuss other theories upon which recovery
could be based. For one, the court found that a contract existed between
physician and patient and that that contract contained an implied warranty
that any confidential information which the physician gained through the
relationship would not be released without the patient's consent. It has
been held that the relationship of physician and patient is a contractual one21
and that the patient may bring an action ex contractu for a breach of duty
arising out of the contract of employment. 22 It has also been asserted that
promises may be found in service contracts by implication.2 Moreover,
it has been suggested in at least one case that such a promise of secrecy is
implied in law as an essential element of any contract between physician
and patient.
2 4
A third theory upon which the court found that an action would lie
against the doctor is invasion of privacy. "If a doctor should reveal any
of these confidences, he surely effects an invasion of the privacy of his
patient. '25 In The Right of Privacy, Hofstadter and Horowitz state:
15. Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942).
16. OHIO REv. CODE § 2317.02 (1954).
17. OHIO REv. CoDE § 4731.22 (1953) which provides in relevant part:
The state medical board may refuse to grant a certificate to a person guilty
of . . . grossly unprofessional or dishonest conduct . . . [which] means:
(b) The willful betrayal of a professional secret ....
18. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OV MEDICAL ETHICS 3-4 (1923).
19. It should be noted that in the Hague case Judge Haneman indicated in his
opinion that Clark and Simonsen impliedly relied on public policy. The instant case
is the first to use the term public policy in its rationale. For a good definition of
public policy see Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E.
505 (1916).
20. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
21. McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (1939).
22. Scott v. Simpson, 46 Ga. App. 479, 167 S.E. 920 (1933).
23. 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 682 (1960).
24. Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tenn. 1965), indicates that the
only possible basis of recovery for unauthorized divulgence is breach of contract.
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[One] right of privacy which constitutes a distinct and well defined
field is that of professional consultations. Communications between
doctor and patient . . . are confidential and privileged. The person
making such confidence has the right to permit or not to permit the
professional man to disclose statements made to him in the course of
their professional relations. Such matters [however] . . . are not
comprehended under the term 'right of privacy.'
26
Dean Prosser has also recognized a tort of invasion of privacy by dis-
closure. 27 But it has been held that in order to constitute the tort of in-
vasion of privacy, the disclosure must be a public and not a private one,
28
that is, it must be contained in printings, writings, pictures, or other perma-
nent publications or reproductions; mere communication by word of mouth
will not suffice.2 9 Since the disclosure in the instant case was not made
public it would seem that no action for invasion of privacy would lie.
Having found that a physician would be liable in damages for divulging
confidential information gained through the doctor-patient relationship, it
would seem an easy matter to go one step further and hold that one who
induces this conduct is also liable in damages. Indeed the Restatement of
Torts provides the applicable rule:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, a person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions
under which the act is done or intending the consequences
which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other
so to conduct himself. .... 30
This rule has been extended to make actionable the inducement of any
actionable wrong, whether tortious at common law or not.31 Thus one
who induces a violation of public policy by another would seem to be
responsible to the injured person for damages under the rule laid down
in the Restatement.
However, while this seems to be the most direct reasoning for holding
the malpractice insurer liable, the court in the present case ignored it and
ultimately based its decision on an "inducing the breach of a fiduciary
relationship" theory. Briefly, the court ruled that a doctor-patient rela-
tionship is a fiduciary one, with the legal obligations of a trustee imposed
upon the fiduciary (doctor). The court found that the same principles of
law governing the behavior of a trustee are applicable to all fiduciaries.
26. HOrSTADTER & HOROWITz, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 4 (1964). (Emphasis
added.)
27. PROSSER, TORTS 834 (3d ed. 1964).
28. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
29. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Gregory v. Bryan-
Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943). With the advent of radio and tele-
vision, the rule was expanded to make actionable publication by those media. Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
30. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 876 (1939).
31. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 33 (1954).
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It concluded that since one is liable for inducing or participating in the
breach of a trustee's duty, a person may be similarly liable for inducing or
participating in the breach of any fiduciary duty. It is not clear here why
the court did not simply rely on the line of cases holding that one who
participates with a fiduciary in a breach of his duties is liable to the injured
party for the damages resulting from the fiduciary's dereliction.
32
There are at least two other theories, not mentioned by the court,
which might be suggested as a basis for recovery against an inducer of
divulgence. The first is the relatively well known tort of "interference with
contractual relations." It has often been held that a person who induces a
breach of contract, including one for personal services, may be held liable
for the injury caused.83 A second possible basis of recovery is the "civil
conspiracy doctrine." It is well established that a person will be criminally
liable for conspiring with another to commit a tortious act.34 It has also
been held that a cause of action lies in tort for a conspiracy which results
in the commission of a wrong. 5 However, civil conspiracy differs from
its criminal counterpart in that a conspiracy is not actionable unless it
actually results in the doing of a wrongful act.3 6 One of the problems in
applying this theory is proving a combination. If the defendant merely
induced the doctor to commit the wrong, this would not amount to a com-
bination. But it may be argued that at the point when the doctor succumbs
to the inducement and agrees to divulge, the two parties become active
participants in a combination to commit the wrong of divulging confidential
information. When the physician proceeds to divulge the information, the
required act is committed.
It is submitted that the court wisely employed the public policy doc-
trine in finding that the conduct of the doctor constituted an actionable
wrong. In a sparsely litigated area such as this, with lack of binding
precedent, it often serves the needs of society for a court to label conduct
as detrimental to the public policy and hence actionable. However, it is not
entirely clear why the court bypassed the simple "inducement of an action-
able wrong" doctrine in favor of its reasoning that one who induces a
fiduciary to breach his duties is liable to the injured party. A more direct
method would have been to find that the doctor had committed the action-
able wrong of unauthorized divulgence, and hence the defendant was liable
for inducing it.
Alan Gilbert Ellis
32. Leven v. Birrell, 92 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Alster v. British Type
Investors, 83 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Voss Oil Co. v. Voss, 367 P.2d 977
(Wyo. 1962).
33. Tipton v. Burson, 73 Ariz. 144, 238 P.2d 1098 (1951). This doctrine has been
well recognized in the tort area. See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 6.5 (1956) ;
PROSSER, TORTS 950 (3d ed. 1964). It has been held that a person who knowingly
induces a breach of contract may be guilty of a tort, and furthermore, that interfer-
ence with the contract not amounting to inducement of breach may also be actionable.
Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
34. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 540 (1957).
35. Sterman v. Ziem, 17 Cal. App. 2d 414, 62 P.2d 160 (1936).
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